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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 Consider an employer that requires all employees to attend rallies 
for a particular presidential candidate, or to sign petitions supporting 
that candidate, or to lobby government for a particular position. Em-
ployees who fail to comply are subject to denial of bonuses, post-
ponement of promotions, or even termination.  
 If the employer were a government agency, this would clearly vio-
late the employees’ free speech rights under the First Amendment.1 
                                                                                                                  
 * Steve Mulroy would like to acknowledge with gratitude the comments of Profs. Lee 
Harris, Ernie Lidge, Andrew McClurg, and Eugene Shapiro of the Cecil C. Humphreys School 
of Law, University of Memphis, and the research assistance of Alex Hall and Logan Klauss. 
 1. See, e.g., Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 517-19 (1980) (stating that with the ex-
ception of certain instances where political affiliation would “interfere with the discharge of 
his public duties . . . continued employment of an assistant public defender cannot properly 
be conditioned upon his allegiance to the political party”); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 
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In some states, a private employee might have some sort of statutory 
protection.2 But, in the many cases where such explicit statutory pro-
tection is lacking, the vast majority of private employees would have 
no remedy. That is so because, for the last century or two, the general 
rule has been that absent explicit contract language to the contrary, 
employment in the private sector is “at will.”3  
 However, in recent decades, courts have, on some occasions, ap-
plied a common law doctrine known as the “public policy exception” 
(PPE) to the at-will employment rule to protect employees in extreme 
cases when the employer’s conduct runs contrary to a definite public 
policy. Originating in such relatively clear-cut cases, as where an 
employer fired an employee for refusing to violate the law,4 or for 
complying with a legal obligation like jury service,5 the exception has 
expanded into other areas where the employer’s adverse employment 
action seems contrary to a clear, widely accepted public policy in the 
state. The doctrine stands as a last line of defense for an employee 
who cannot point to express statutory text, explicit contractual lan-
guage, or specific facts creating an implied contract. It creates a 
“floor” for fair treatment by employers to which all private employees 
are entitled. To the extent one considers such a floor necessary to 
safeguard important public policies, then, the PPE is important. 
 Courts vary in their application of this doctrine in wrongful dis-
charge claims. In the “forced speech” example above, which has actu-
ally occurred and is not strictly hypothetical, some courts have 
granted the employee relief while others have not.6 While courts that 
recognize the PPE may theoretically allow use of constitutional prin-
ciples to inform their determination of what is clear and substantial 
public policy within their states, there has been less enthusiasm for 
using constitutional principles in PPE cases as opposed to statutory 
                                                                                                                  
(1976) (holding termination of public employees based on party affiliation unconstitutional 
under the First and Fourteenth Amendments).  
 2. See infra Part V.B.1.c (discussing state statutory protections of free speech rights 
of private employees).  
 3. A noteworthy exception to the general rule exists in the State of Montana, which 
statutorily protects employees from being discharged absent good cause. MONT. CODE 
ANN. § 39-2-904 (2013); see also infra notes 233-38 and accompanying text (describing state 
statutes and case law providing protection against termination for off-duty, off-premises 
conduct). Cf. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-1501 (2013) (regulating employment termination 
in the private sector). 
 4. See, e.g., Martin Marietta Corp. v. Lorenz, 823 P.2d 100, 109 (Colo. 1992) (recog-
nizing a public-policy exception where “the employer directed the employee to perform an 
illegal act as part of the employee’s work related duties”). 
 5. See, e.g., Nees v. Hocks, 536 P.2d 512, 515-16 (Or. 1975) (concluding that employ-
er’s termination of employee for refusing to be excused from jury duty was driven by a “so-
cially undesirable motive” which created a viable cause of action for wrongful discharge 
based on public policy).  
 6. See infra Part V.B.1.a (discussing such “forced speech” cases).  
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or regulatory rules.7 In large part, this is because constitutional prin-
ciples are generally considered to apply only where there is state ac-
tion, and thus may be seen as less directly analogous to the setting of 
a private employment dispute.8 
 Such a dilemma can occur in many different situations where pri-
vate employers fire employees under circumstances at odds with con-
firmed policy behind a constitutional principle. For example, cases 
have arisen in which employers allegedly fired employees for having 
an abortion.9 Other cases have involved other types of “free speech” 
issues, such as when employers forbade workers from speaking out 
on matters of public concern,10 forced them to engage in political 
speech with which they disagreed,11 or pressured them into making 
political contributions.12 Controversies also have arisen over private 
employer decisions to fire employees for wearing long hair,13 for 
smoking off-duty and off-premises,14 and for drinking off-duty and off-
premises.15 Such cases indicate that employees expect their funda-
mental rights to be respected in the workplace. 
 Similarly, society places high value on the right to vote, the free-
dom of worship, and the right to be free from unwarranted intrusion 
into intimate matters. When employers use the coercive power at 
their disposal to undermine these values, one might be inclined to 
                                                                                                                  
 7. See infra Part III.A (discussing the use of constitutional versus other sources of 
law in determining public policy under the PPE).  
 8. See infra Part III.A (discussing the use of constitutional versus other sources of 
law in determining public policy under the PPE).  
 9. Barbara Presley Noble, A Firing for Cause, or for Abortion?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.  
16, 1994, at F23. Not all such cases were resolved, id., and at least one was resolved 
through confidential settlement. See Alan J. Craver, Stylist Who Said Her Abortion Led to 
Firing Settles Suit, THE BALT. SUN, Feb. 5, 1995, at 11C. Most of these cases went resolved 
or unsettled. Id. 
 10. See Flesner v. Technical Commc’ns Corp., 575 N.E.2d 1107, 1111 (Mass. 1991) (apply-
ing the PPE to termination for cooperating with a federal investigation of the employer). 
 11. See Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 894, 900 (3d Cir. 1983) (recognizing a 
PPE where company fired worker for refusing to lobby state legislature for policies favored 
by the company). 
 12. See Robert Kelner, Allegations of Employer Coercion of Political Activity Are on the 
Rise, INSIDE POLITICAL LAW (Oct. 17, 2012), http://www.insidepoliticallaw.com/ 
2012/10/17/allegations-of-employer-coercion-of-political-activity-are-on-the-rise/ (describing 
such incidents).  
 13. Miller v. Safeway, Inc., 102 P.3d 282, 295 (Alaska 2004). 
 14. Debra J. Saunders, Where There’s Smoke, You’re Fired, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 17, 
2005, at B13; see also Amy H. Moorman, Employer Regulation of Off-Duty Smoking: Meet-
ing the Needs of Employers and Employees with Smoking Cessation Programs, J. 
INDIVIDUAL EMP’T RTS, 1994-95, at 243, 243 (discussing the merits of employing non-
smokers from an organizational perspective, but cautioning against the “slippery slope” of 
involvement with employees’ off-duty activities). 
 15. Best Lock Corp. v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Dep’t of Emp’t & Training Servs., 572 
N.E.2d 520, 521-22 (Ind. App. 1991) (concluding that employer did not have just cause to 
fire employee for violating work policy prohibiting the off-duty consumption of alcohol). 
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believe that courts should provide employees with common law pro-
tections. But the law’s laissez-faire preference for “at-will” employ-
ment arrangements, and an intuitive distinction between the appli-
cation of constitutional principles to public versus private employers, 
tug in the opposite direction. 
 For example, in Novosel v. Nationwide Insurance Company, the 
Third Circuit, applying Pennsylvania law in a diversity case, ex-
plained at length how constitutional principles could legitimately 
form the basis for a judicially found “public policy” under the PPE.16 
Several years later, after intervening Pennsylvania cases rejected 
constitutionally inspired PPE claims,17 the Third Circuit sharply lim-
ited Novosel, holding that the absence of state action undercut the 
utility of constitutional doctrine in deciding the contours of the state’s 
public policy.18 
 This divergence mirrors one shown among various state courts. 
While many of them either explicitly or implicitly drew upon constitu-
tional sources,19 and no state that recognizes a broad PPE specifically 
excludes constitutional sources from its public policy analysis,20 a fair 
number of courts have criticized the practice over the years.21 Many, 
but not all, of the later cases involved First Amendment issues. 
                                                                                                                  
 16. 721 F.2d at 899-900. 
 17. See, e.g., Booth v. McDonnell Douglas Truck Servs., Inc. 585 A.2d 24, 28 (Pa. Su-
per. Ct. 1991) (stating that certain state constitutional provisions protecting contract rights 
and obligations did not support employee’s right to collect unpaid commissions as a public 
policy claim because there was no state action).  
 18. Borse v. Piece Goods Shop, Inc., 963 F.2d 611, 620 (3d Cir. 1992). 
 19. See, e.g., Gantt v. Sentry Ins., 824 P.2d 680, 687-88 (Cal. 1992) (referencing only 
“the constitution or statutory provisions”); Parnar v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 652 P.2d 625, 
631 (Haw. 1982) (determining that a clear mandate of public policy is violated when “the 
employer's conduct contravenes the letter or purpose of a constitutional, statutory, or  
regulatory provision or scheme”); Fleshner v. Pepose Vision Inst., P.C., 304 S.W.3d 81, 92 
(Mo. 2010) (en banc) (listing “the constitution, statutes, regulations promulgated pursuant 
to statute, or rules created by a governmental body”); Dohme v. Eurand America, Inc., 956 
N.E.2d 825, 829 (Ohio 2011) (noting that the Constitution is one source of public policy  
in applying the PPE); Scott v. Extracorporeal, Inc., 545 A.2d 334, 342 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) 
(stating that public policy must be articulated “in law or a constitutional provision”);  
Gardner v. Loomis Armored Inc., 913 P.2d 377, 380 (Wash. 1996) (examining whether em-
ployer’s conduct “contravenes the letter or purpose of a constitutional, statutory, or regula-
tory provision or scheme” (quoting Parnar, 652 P.2d at 631 (emphasis added))); Birthisel v. 
Tri-Cities Health Servs. Corp., 424 S.E.2d 606, 612 (W. Va. 1992) (noting a constitutional 
basis for public policy in applying the PPE); Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 335 N.W.2d 
834, 840 (Wis. 1983) (listing only “constitutional or statutory provision”). While state  
courts vary, most draw upon both federal and state constitutions as sources of public poli-
cy. See infra Part III.B.  
 20. See generally infra Part III.A.  
 21. See Grzyb v. Evans, 700 S.W.2d 399, 402 (Ky. 1985) (rejecting a “freedom of asso-
ciation” basis for a wrongful discharge claim, because the freedom of association right only 
applies to governments (citing United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am. v. Scott, 463 
U.S. 825 (1985) (dealing with a state action requirement when suing directly under the 
First Amendment, not a PPE))); Cisco v. United Parcel Servs., Inc., 476 A.2d 1340, 1344 
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 Some scholars have urged that federal or state constitutional pro-
visions should be among the potential sources of relevant public poli-
cy for purposes of allegedly wrongful employment practices.22 Howev-
er, they have not given the issue extensive analysis and discussion. 
In recent years, scholars have examined the issue from a more topic-
specific perspective, such as the right of employee privacy,23 or with a 
state-specific or even case-specific focus.24 
 Other scholars have discussed more generally the connection be-
tween constitutional law and private law. One approach is to exam-
ine when private action may be treated as equivalent to public action, 
and thus be subject to constitutional norms.25 Furthermore, interna-
tional law recognizes a doctrine known as “direct horizontal effect,” 
wherein the constitutional human rights guarantees of a country are 
applied to govern relations between private parties.26 Just recently, 
in 2012, the Supreme Court dramatically changed constitutional 
criminal procedure law by importing private, common law property 
                                                                                                                  
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (rejecting presumption of innocence-based PPE claim and stating that 
constitutional rights were not meant to be “superimposed into” one’s “remaining life expe-
riences”); Bushko v. Miller Brewing Co., 396 N.W.2d 167, 172 (Wis. 1986) (narrowly con-
struing the PPE and rejecting a free speech-based PPE claim, lest it open a “Pandora’s box” 
of due process and equal protection arguments which would “eliminate any distinction 
between private and governmental employment”). Cisco echoes similar choices made by 
other courts within Pennsylvania. See Booth, 585 A.2d at 28 (finding no constitutional ba-
sis for a public policy cause of action because no state action was involved), appeal denied, 
597 A.2d 1150 (Pa. 1991); Veno v. Meredith, 515 A.2d 571, 581 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (re-
jecting on similar grounds a PPE claim by newspaper editor fired for publishing an article 
criticizing a judge); Martin v. Capital Cities Media, Inc., 511 A.2d 830, 844 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1986) (rejecting free speech-based PPE claim against private newspaper). 
 22. See, e.g., Richard L. Alfred & Ben T. Clements, The Public Policy Exception to the 
At-Will Employment Rule, 78 MASS. L. REV. 88, 93-94 (1993); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., The 
Future of Wrongful Dismissal Claims: Where Does Employer Self Interest Lie?, 58 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 397, 402-03 (1989) (urging ready use by courts of both federal and state constitutional 
sources in applying the PPE).  
 23. See, e.g., Adam Shinar, Public Employee Speech and the Privatization of the First 
Amendment, 46 CONN. L. REV. 1, 22-24 (2013) (referencing the issue briefly as background 
with respect to free speech); John B. Wefing, Employer Drug Testing: Disparate Judicial 
and Legislative Responses, 63 ALB. L. REV. 799 (2000) (contrasting drug testing rules for 
public and private employers); Jill Yung, Big Brother IS Watching: How Employee Monitor-
ing in 2004 Brought Orwell’s 1984 to Life and What the Law Should Do About It, 36 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 163 (2005) (discussing electronic monitoring of employees via video surveil-
lance, GPS tracking, and Internet usage tracking software).  
 24. See, e.g., Ivo Becica, Note, Privacy—State Constitutional Privacy Rights Against 
Private Employers: A “Hairy” Issue in Alaska. Miller v. Safeway, Inc., 102 P.3d 282 (Alaska 
2004), 37 RUTGERS L.J. 1235 (2006) (discussing Alaska case involving privacy of private 
employee); Maureen Binetti, Minding Your Business: Is Your Life After Work Really Pri-
vate?, N.J. LAW. MAG., Apr. 2008, at 33 (discussing law in New Jersey on employer inter-
ference with off-duty, off-premises behavior such as smoking). 
 25. See Christian Turner, State Action Problems, 65 FLA. L. REV. 281 (2013).  
 26. See Willmai Rivera-Pérez, What’s the Constitution Got to Do with It? Expanding 
the Scope of Constitutional Rights into the Private Sphere, 3 CREIGHTON INT'L & COMP. L.J. 
189 (2012) (comparative analysis of the “direct horizontal effect”). 
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notions of trespass.27 In evaluating police investigative acts, the 
Court held that where the common law would recognize a trespass to 
private property, the acts constitute a “search” within the meaning of 
the Fourth Amendment.28 Just as fruitful is an evaluation of the re-
verse dynamic, wherein constitutional principles inform the applica-
tion of a common law cause of action. 
 Assuming that constitutional principles indeed have some signifi-
cant role to play in evaluating such a common law claim, significant 
questions remain as to which constitutional principles, and how to 
apply them to arguably analogous factual situations in the private 
employment sphere. If we acknowledge a strong public policy in favor 
of the right to vote, should we reason similarly with respect to the 
right to bear arms? If we apply free speech principles to protect an 
employee from being forced to sign a petition with which she disa-
grees, should we apply them equally to allow her to publicly criticize 
her employer and bring it into disrepute? Scholarship has not dis-
cussed the issues in this manner. 
 This Article discusses the use of the PPE to vindicate constitu-
tional interests. It takes an interdisciplinary approach, mixing analy-
sis from business law, tort law, and constitutional law. It argues that 
courts can and should consider constitutional principles when decid-
ing PPE claims. Constitutional principles have as valid a place in the 
PPE analysis as do statutory principles. This Article also argues that 
some constitutional rights are more amenable to a private-sector anal-
ogy, and/or more appropriate for a PPE analysis. For example, the 
right to informational privacy is more translatable to the private em-
ployment context than the rights guaranteed by the Establishment 
Clause. And the right to free speech enjoys more of a current public 
policy consensus than the right to abortion, or to bear arms. For each 
of several different constitutional provisions examined, this Article 
recommends general principles to guide courts in applying the PPE.   
 Part II lays out background on the PPE. Part III discusses the ex-
tent to which courts have used constitutional principles to inform 
their discussion, and argues that such principles are appropriate 
sources of policy, at least in certain limited situations. Part IV dis-
cusses the extent to which the PPE cause of action is necessary or 
advisable, given existing statutory remedies for similar types of em-
ployee complaints. Part V suggests how one might apply to the PPE 
such specific constitutional provisions or doctrines as: free speech, 
the Fourth Amendment, equal protection, reproductive rights, sub-
stantive due process, procedural due process, and the Second 
Amendment. Part VI offers concluding thoughts.  
                                                                                                                  
 27. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
 28. Id. at 949-50. 
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II.   THE PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION TO AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT 
 A fundamental rule of employment contract law is, in the absence 
of a contractual term or statutory provision to the contrary, employ-
ment is presumed to be at will. That is, the employer can fire the em-
ployee for a good reason, a bad reason, or no reason at all.29 
 One well-recognized exception to the at-will employment rule is 
the PPE.30 This judicially created exception emerged in recent dec-
ades, representing a departure from traditional common law at-will 
employment principles.31 
 In some ways, the rise of this exception constitutes a movement 
back toward the law of the eighteenth century, when masters had 
implied obligations to “treat the servant humanely” and to “furnish 
him with suitable lodging.”32 Back then, for example, instead of a 
presumption of at-will employment, the common law presumed an 
implied one-year term of employment if the term was not specified.33 
This made sense in a largely agrarian society. It protected the serv-
ant from being used during the growing and harvest season only to 
be let go when the ground was barren; it also protected the master 
from having to support a servant during the winter only to be aban-
doned for a better offer once serious work had to be done.34 
                                                                                                                  
 29. 10 LEX K. LARSON, EMP. DISCRIMINATION § 174.01 (2d ed. 2012); see, e.g., Phipps 
v. IASD Health Servs. Corp., 558 N.W.2d 198, 202 (Iowa 1997) (noting that, unless a valid 
employment contract exists between parties, “an employer may discharge an employee at 
any time, for any reason, or no reason at all”); Fleshner v. Pepose Vision Inst., P.C., 304 
S.W.3d 81, 91 (Mo. 2010) (en banc) (asserting that “[g]enerally, at-will employees may be 
terminated for any reason or for no reason”);.  
 30. LARSON, supra note 29, § 174.01.  
 31. Donald C. Carroll, At-Will Employment: The Arc of Justice Bends Towards the 
Doctrine’s Rejection, 46 U.S.F. L. REV. 655, 668-69 (2012) (supporting the PPE); R. Scott 
Oswald & Michael L. Vogelsang Jr., The ABCs of Common Law Wrongful Termination 
Claims in the Washington Metropolitan Region, 3 LAB. & EMP. L.F. 197, 199-202 (2013) 
(tracing the development of the PPE from initial emergence to broad acceptance among 
jurisdictions); Christopher L. Pennington, Comment, The Public Policy Exception to the 
Employment-at-Will Doctrine: Its Inconsistencies in Application, 68 TUL. L. REV. 1583, 
1594-98 (1994) (same, and criticizing its application); Kenneth R. Swift, The Public Policy 
Exception to Employment At-Will: Time to Retire a Noble Warrior?, 61 MERCER L. REV. 551, 
553-63 (2010) (opposing the PPE).  
 32. H.G. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT § 83, at 165-66 
(William S. Hein & Co. 1981) (1877) (emphasis omitted); see generally HENRY H. PERRITT, 
JR., EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL LAW AND PRACTICE § 1.03 (5th ed. 2008) (discussing how the 
Industrial Revolution influenced an economy-driven approach to employment that under-
mined traditional employer obligations regarding public policy). 
 33. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 413 (Oxford, 
Clarendon Press 1765) (“The contract between [servants] and their masters arises upon the 
hiring. If the hiring be general without any particular time limited, the law construes it be 
a hiring for a year.”); see also Kenneth A. Sprang, Beware the Toothless Tiger: A Critique of 
the Model Employment Termination Act, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 849, 860 (1994) (discussing the 
American courts’ adoption of this one-year presumption during the nineteenth century). 
 34. Pennington, supra note 31, at 1584-85 n.7. 
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 With the advent of industrialization came a different approach, 
one which emphasized the freedom of contract so as to enhance com-
merce and reduce burdens on business.35 This approach enshrined  
a default at-will rule by the end of the nineteenth century.36 It  
preceded a near-parallel development in constitutional law, the so-
called “Lochner era,” during which the Supreme Court imposed a 
laissez-faire approach to employment regulation based on a supposed 
constitutional freedom of contract.37 This development is another ex-
ample of the interplay between constitutional law and the common 
law of employment.  
 Later in the twentieth century, two decades after the end of the 
Lochner era, courts began to recognize policy-based exceptions to the 
at-will rule.38 One prominent expert in the field has called the erosion 
of the at-will doctrine “[t]he most significant employment law devel-
opment in the last quarter of the 20th century.”39 Under the PPE, an 
employee can bring suit for wrongful discharge where the termina-
tion was in violation of a clear public policy.40 For example, courts 
may intervene when an employer fires workers because they refused 
to violate the law,41 complied with a legal requirement,42 or engaged 
in some form of protected activity.43 Jurisdictions vary as to which 
                                                                                                                  
 35. Id. at 1585; see also infra notes 137-139 (discussing the perceived burden on em-
ployers as the motivating factor behind limiting statutory causes of action). 
 36. Pennington, supra note 31, at 1585. 
 37. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905) (finding a statutory regulation of 
labor hours within private businesses to be an unconstitutional infringement on the “free-
dom of contract” due process right as well as an invalid use of police power). The Lochner 
era ended thirty years later when the Court rejected the notion that the freedom to con-
tract precluded government regulation of the labor market. EDWIN CHEMERINSKY, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 8.2 (4th ed. 2011) (analyzing this laissez-
faire philosophy as stemming from a “social Darwinism” in which the individual’s freedom 
to contract limited the government’s regulatory power). See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin 
Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 31-32 (1937). 
 38. The first case to recognize a PPE to the at-will rule was Petermann v. Int’l Bhd. of 
Teamsters, 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959). Pennington, supra note 31, at 1593. 
 39. Perritt, supra note 22, at 397.  
 40. LARSON, supra note 29, § 174.04[1]; see also Mello v. Stop & Shop Cos., 524 N.E.2d 
105 (Mass. 1988) (the PPE may apply to termination of employee for reporting employer’s 
criminal conduct); Collins v. Rizkana, 652 N.E.2d 653 (Ohio 1995) (establishing sexual 
harassment as a valid basis for the PPE); Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 685 P.2d 1081 
(Wash. 1984) (holding that it violated clear public policy to discharge plaintiff for comply-
ing with federal statute on accounting procedures). 
 41. See, e.g., Woodson v. AMF Leisureland Ctrs., Inc., 842 F.2d 699 (3d Cir. 1988) 
(upholding a PPE action when barmaid was fired for refusing to serve alcohol to visibly  
intoxicated persons). 
 42. See, e.g., Nees v. Hocks, 536 P.2d 512 (Or. 1975) (creating a PPE where employee 
was fired for refusing employer's request to ask for excuse from jury duty). 
 43. See, e.g., Porter v. Reardon Mach. Co., 962 S.W.2d 932, 937-38 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) 
(recognizing exception for “whistleblower” activity). 
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public policies qualify for the PPE,44 but virtually every jurisdiction 
recognizes some form of this exception.45 
 Some courts explicitly limit the cause of action to cases where the 
employee has actually been discharged.46 But there is no theoretical 
reason why this doctrine could not apply to other adverse employ-
ment actions besides termination. Some courts have so held.47 How-
ever, the overwhelming majority of the cases involve full termination, 
leading courts to speak of this as a “wrongful discharge” cause of ac-
tion. It also sometimes is referred to as the tort of “retaliatory dis-
charge,” at least where the complaint alleges termination in retalia-
tion for the exercise of a protected right, or for the failure to violate a 
clear law or policy upon the direction of a superior.48 
 The cause of action is normally characterized as a tort.49 Some au-
thorities suggest that the cause of action also may be partially 
                                                                                                                  
 44. Compare Sventko v. Kroger Co., 245 N.W.2d 151 (Mich. Ct. App. 1976) (creating a 
PPE cause of action where en employee filed workers’ compensation claim), and McGarrity 
v. Berlin Metals, Inc., 774 N.E.2d 71 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (finding cause of action for retali-
atory discharge where employee refused to commit illegal act for which he would be per-
sonally liable), and Call v. Scott Brass, Inc., 553 N.E.2d 1225 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (applying 
PPE where employee was fired for complying with jury duty summons), with Campbell v. 
Eli Lilly & Co., 413 N.E.2d 1054 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (denying cause of action where em-
ployee was terminated for reporting supervisor misconduct to company officials), and Price 
v. Carmack Datsun, Inc., 485 N.E.2d 359 (Ill. 1985) (finding no cognizable PPE for an em-
ployee who filed insurance claim because it did not affect the public interest), and Mac-
Donald v. E. Fine Paper, Inc., 485 A.2d 228 (Me. 1984) (declining to find a PPE for wrong-
ful discharge of an employee who was fired for filing a workers’ compensation claim be-
cause remedy already existed under Workers’ Compensation Act).  
 45. GERARD P. PANARO, EMPLOYMENT LAW MANUAL: RECRUITMENT, SELECTION, 
TERMINATION ¶ 7.02 (1990); see also PERRITT, supra note 32, § 7.09[B][1] (acknowledging 
that most courts recognize a PPE to at-will employment where an employee is fired for 
serving jury duty).   
 46. See, e.g., Darchak v. City of Chi. Bd. of Educ., 580 F.3d 622, (7th Cir. 2009) (declin-
ing to extend Illinois PPE to any injury short of actual discharge); Dixon v. Denny’s  
Inc., 957 F. Supp. 792, 799 (E.D. Va. 1996) (concluding “that the public policy exception  
to Virginia's employment at will doctrine does not yet encompass constructive discharges 
as well as actual discharges”); Roberts v. Dudley, 993 P.2d 901 (Wash. 2000) (limiting the 
PPE to termination). 
 47. See, e.g., Hunter v. Port Auth. of Allegheny Cnty., 419 A.2d 631 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1980) (recognizing doctrine’s applicability to a refusal to hire); MISSOURI APPROVED JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS (CIVIL) § 38.03 cmt. A (Robert T. Adams et al., eds., 7th ed. 2012) (contem-
plating such a cause of action in cases of “constructive discharge, demotion, or adverse job 
consequences,” but declining to take a position on the validity of such a claim). 
 48. See, e.g., Turner v. Mem’l Med. Ctr., 911 N.E.2d 369, 375-76 (Ill. 2009) (using the 
terms “wrongful discharge” and “retaliatory discharge” interchangeably in a case involving 
a medical employee allegedly fired in retaliation for speaking out about patient safety); 
Birthisel v. Tri-Cities Health Servs. Corp., 424 S.E.2d 606, 611 (W. Va. 1992) (using both 
terms to describe a claim by a medical employee fired for choosing professional ethics 
standards over a conflicting company policy). 
 49. See, e.g., Vigil v. Arzola, 699 P.2d 613, 619 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983) (acknowledging 
that the majority of courts find the public policy cause of action to sound in tort, which 
“provides a more appropriate rationale than one [sounding] in contract”).  
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grounded in the common law’s implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing, which sounds in contract law.50 
 The basic rationale for the exception is that, while an employer 
should generally be free from interference in choosing whom to em-
ploy, the public has an interest in ensuring that the inherently coer-
cive power of an employer to discharge is not used to pressure em-
ployees to disregard the law, forfeit important rights, or otherwise 
contravene substantial public policy interests.51 Even where such 
public interests are implicated, though, the employer may still pre-
vail where there is some “separate, plausible and legitimate reason” 
for taking the challenged action.52 
 A typical listing of the elements of the cause of action includes: 
(1) The existence of a clear public policy: i.e., the “clarity” element; 
(2) The termination placed that policy in jeopardy: i.e., the “jeop-
ardy” element; 
(3) The plaintiff’s termination was actually motivated by conduct 
related to the public policy: i.e., the “causation” element; and  
(4) The employer lacked a legitimate business justification for 
terminating the employee: i.e., the “overriding justifica-
tion” element.53 
 While there is a theoretical difference between the second and 
third elements, there is little distinguishing them in practice. Typi-
cally, the public policy at issue is placed in jeopardy precisely because 
of the causal link between the termination and the policy. Thus, the 
causation proxy leads to the jeopardy prong. 
                                                                                                                  
 50. See, e.g., Norcon, Inc. v. Kotowski, 971 P.2d 158, 167 (Alaska 1999) (public policy 
tort largely encompassed by implied covenant); Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Oxford, 743 S.W.2d 
380, 385 (Ark. 1988) (concluding that a contract cause of action is most appropriate for a 
wrongful discharge claim); Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 335 N.W.2d 834, 841 (Wis. 
1983) (finding the remedies provided by wrongful discharge statutes to be more applicable 
to contract causes of action than tort causes action). 
 51. MARK W. BENNETT ET AL., EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIPS: LAW AND 
PRACTICE § 2.02[F][b] (2014) (describing the PPE as having particular significance in situa-
tions where an employee refuses to commit illegal acts, exercises a legal right, performs a 
public duty, or reports an employer’s misconduct); see also Strozinsky v. Sch. Dist. of 
Brown Deer, 614 N.W.2d 443, 453 (Wis. 2000) (asserting that the exception “properly bal-
ances the need to protect employees from terminations that contradict public policy with 
the employer’s historical discretion to discharge employees under the freedom to contract 
embodied in the at-will doctrine”). 
 52. Borse v. Piece Goods Shop, Inc., 963 F.2d 611, 616 (3d Cir. 1992) (citing Cisco v. 
United Parcel Servs., Inc., 476 A.2d 1340, 1343 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984)).  
 53. See Fitzgerald v. Salsbury Chem., Inc., 613 N.W.2d 275, 282 n.2 (Iowa 2000) (ref-
erencing this four-part elemental foundation as being a sufficient basis for a PPE cause of 
action); Collins v. Rizkana, 652 N.E.2d 653, 657-58 (Ohio 1995) (same); PERRITT, supra 
note 31, § 7.04 (recognizing these four elements as the basic analytical framework for a 
public policy tort cause of action).  
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 Courts caution that the PPE should be narrow and not expanded 
lightly.54 The default position is still at-will employment. Other than 
contractual terms between the parties, courts say, deviations from 
this default arrangement should be specified by the legislature.55 
 Further, the public policy alleged to have been violated by the ad-
verse employment action must be “substantial.”56 As one court stated, 
the public policy must “strike at the heart of a citizen’s social rights, 
duties, and responsibilities.”57 The existence of the policy, as well as 
its contours and scope, must be relatively clear so as to place employ-
ers on proper notice of a potential violation.58 The analogy here would 
be to qualified immunity for public officials, where the court must 
find a violation of “clearly established law.”59 
 A listing of categories of typical situations in which PPE cases 
arise includes those where employers fired employees: 
 (1) For refusing to commit an illegal act; 
 (2) For performing a legal duty; 
 (3) For exercising a legal right or privilege; or 
 (4) In retaliation for reporting misconduct.60 
 An example of category (1) would be termination for refusing to 
commit perjury before an official panel overseeing or investigating 
the company.61 An example of category (2) would be an instance in 
which an employee must report for jury duty, or has an affirmative 
                                                                                                                  
 54. See, e.g., Gardner v. Loomis Armored Inc., 913 P.2d 377, 380 (Wash. 1996) (stating 
that courts should exercise caution when declaring public policy absent express legislative 
or judicial expression on the subject (citing Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 685 P.2d 1081 
(Wash. 1984))); PERRITT, supra note 32, § 7.05[B] (describing courts’ general reluctance to 
extend the exception beyond the express language of a statute).  
 55. See Horn v. N.Y. Times, 790 N.E.2d 753, 756 (N.Y. 2003) (“[S]ignificant alteration 
of employment relationships . . . is best left to the Legislature . . . because stability and 
predictability in contractual affairs is a highly desirable jurisprudential value.” (quoting 
Sabetay v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 506 N.E.2d 919, 923 (N.Y. 1987))); see also Borden v. John-
son, 395 S.E.2d 628, 629 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990) (cautioning that the courts should not “usurp 
the legislative function” by making their own decisions regarding the public policies which 
would trump the general rule of at-will employment). 
 56. Birthisel v. Tri-Cities Health Servs. Corp., 424 S.E.2d 606, 612 (W. Va. 1992). 
 57. Dicomes v. State, 782 P.2d 1002, 1006 (Wash. 1989) (en banc) (quoting Palmateer 
v. Int’l Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876 (Ill. 1981)); see also Booth v. McDonnell Douglas 
Truck Servs., Inc., 585 A.2d 24, 28 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (using similar language).  
 58. Birthisel, 424 S.E.2d at 612.  
 59. Id. at 612 n.8.  
 60. See, e.g., Field v. Phila. Elec. Co., 565 A.2d 1170, 1176 (Pa. Super. Ct 1989) (dis-
closing safety problems at nuclear power plant); see also JOHN C. MCCARTHY, RECOVERY OF 
DAMAGES FOR WRONGFUL DISCHARGE 2D §§ 1.5, 1.9, 1.22, 1.24 (1990) (providing an in-
depth analysis for each of these four distinct situations). 
 61. See Woodson v. AMF Leisureland Ctrs., Inc., 842 F.2d 699, 702 (3d Cir. 1988) 
(upholding PPE action where barmaid was fired for refusing to serve alcohol to visibly  
intoxicated persons); Petermann v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 344 P.2d 25, 27 (Cal. Dist.  
Ct. App. 1959). 
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duty to report misconduct at the place of work.62 An example of (4) 
would be any legitimate whistleblowing case.63 
 It is the third category that is relevant to this Article. An uncon-
troversial and common example for this category would be cases in-
volving terminations for filing a workers’ compensation claim.64 But 
what remedy, if any, does an employee have who is fired for exercis-
ing a constitutional right—in other words, for engaging in a constitu-
tionally protected activity? 
III.   CONSTITUTIONAL SOURCE OF PUBLIC POLICY VERSUS OTHER 
LEGAL SOURCES  
A.   Generally 
 Courts discussing the PPE uniformly recognize statutes and judi-
cial decisions as valid sources of the public policy at issue in these 
cases.65 Regarding the former, to get a sense of the public policy of  
the state, a court can look not only to statutory text, but also to  
legislative history.66 
 But the use of constitutional law as a source has not always been 
viewed favorably. Some commentators have suggested generally that 
it is more difficult to use as a source of public policy,67 or that certain 
states exclude such use.68 In most of these states, rather than  
being specifically hostile to constitutional sources per se, courts are 
actually just hostile to the PPE in general. They either reject it out-
                                                                                                                  
 62. See Call v. Scott Brass, Inc., 553 N.E.2d 1225 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (granting cause 
of action for employee’s executing statutory duty to comply with a summons to appear 
for jury duty); Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, Inc., 386 A.2d 119, 119-20 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1978) (employee fired for missing work due to jury service). 
 63. See infra Part V.B.1.b. 
 64. See, e.g., Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 384 N.E.2d 353 (Ill. 1979); Frampton v. Cent. 
Ind. Gas Co., 297 N.E.2d 425 (Ind. 1973); Hrab v. Hayes-Albion Corp, 302 N.W.2d 606 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1981). 
 65. PANARO, supra note 45, ¶ 7.02. 
 66. See, e.g., Hansen v. Am. Online, Inc., 96 P.3d 950, 954 n.7 (Utah 2004) (bypassing 
a statutory text analysis by looking to legislative history and debate as a legitimate means 
of defining the public policy of weapons in the workplace).  
 67. See PANARO, supra note 45, ¶ 7.03[2]. 
 68. See BENNETT ET AL., supra note 51, at app. 2B, 2-71 to 2-89 (2014) (listing Arizona, 
Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, New York, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin 
as states that do not look to constitutional sources for public policy claims). 
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right,69 or else view it so narrowly as to effectively preclude use of 
constitutional sources.70 
 Indeed, the use of constitutional principles as a source now is gen-
erally accepted, though it has received some criticism by state courts. 
Some state courts explicitly refer to constitutional provisions as a po-
tential source of the public policy. A typical formulation is to ask 
whether the employer’s action “contravenes the letter or purpose of a 
constitutional, statutory, or regulatory provision or scheme.”71 This 
reference to at least constitutional and statutory sources of public 
policy is common.72 Other courts have implicitly recognized constitu-
tional sources while rejecting constitution-sourced PPE claims on 
their facts, considering in detail claims involving employer actions 
interfering with free speech,73 religious freedom,74 and the right to 
                                                                                                                  
 69. See, e.g., Bruley v. Village Green Mgmt. Co., 592 F. Supp. 2d 1381, 1387-88 (M.D. 
Fla. 2008), aff'd per curiam, 333 Fed. App’x 491 (11th Cir. 2009); Wright v. Dothan Chrys-
ler Plymouth Dodge, Inc., 658 So. 2d 428, 431 (Ala. 1995); Pacheo v. Raytheon Co., 623 
A.2d 464, 465 (R.I. 1993) (per curiam). 
 70. See, e.g., Poole v. In Home Health, LLC, 742 S.E.2d 492, 494 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013) 
(judicially created exceptions to at-will employment disfavored, so Georgia courts defer to 
legislature to create exceptions); McArn v. Allied Bruce-Terminix Co., 626 So. 2d 603, 607 
(Miss. 1993) (recognizing only two circumstances in which the PPE applies: (1) where an 
employee refuses to participate in an illegal act; (2) where an employee is discharged for 
reporting illegal acts of his employer); Wieder v. Skala, 609 N.E.2d 105, 110 (N.Y. 1992) 
(creating a narrow exception to employment at-will employment but reiterating that fur-
ther alterations are “best left to the legislature”); Ed Rachal Found. v. D’Unger 207 S.W.3d 
330, 333 (Tex. 2006) (PPE limited to employees terminated for whistleblowing only where 
reporting the employer’s illegal conduct is a legal obligation rather than a mere civic duty); 
Paul H. Tobias, State-by-State Compendium of Leading and Representative Decisions Con-
cerning the Public Policy Tort Doctrine, 1 LIT. WRONG. DISCHARGE CLAIMS app. 5A (last 
updated Dec. 2013), available at Westlaw, 1 LITWDCS App. 5A (collecting cases establish-
ing that Indiana courts have so far limited the PPE to cases involving workers’ compensa-
tion or terminations for refusing to commit an illegal act).  
 71. Gardner v. Loomis Armored Inc., 913 P.2d 377, 380 (Wash. 1996) (quoting Thomp-
son v. St. Regis Paper Co., 685 P.2d 1081, 1089 (Wash. 1984)). 
 72. See Gantt v. Sentry Ins., 824 P.2d 680, 687-88 (Cal. 1992) (en banc) (referencing 
“constitutional or statutory provisions”); Fleshner v. Pepose Vision Inst., P.C., 304 S.W.3d 
81, 92 (Mo. 2010) (en banc) (listing “the constitution, statutes, regulations promulgated 
pursuant to statute, or rules created by a governmental body”); Scott v. Extracorporeal, 
Inc., 545 A.2d 334, 342 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (public policy must be articulated “in law  
or constitutional provision”); Payne v. Rozendaal, 520 A.2d 586, 587 (Vt. 1986) (listing con-
stitution, statute, judicial decision, and “customs and conventions of the people”); Brock-
meyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 335 N.W.2d 834, 840 (Wis. 1983) (listing only “constitutional 
or statutory provision”). 
 73. See, e.g., Korb v. Raytheon Corp., 574 N.E.2d 370 (Mass. 1991) (holding that a 
company spokesperson whose official remarks conflicted with employer interests did not 
have a cognizable wrongful discharge claim on the basis of free speech). 
 74. See, e.g., Kolodziej v. Smith, 588 N.E.2d 634, 638 (Mass. 1992) (acknowledging the 
existence of the PPE where an employer inhibits the free exercise of religion in the work-
place or dismisses an employee on the basis of religion, but finding that requiring attend-
ance at an employee training seminar referencing Christian ideology does not restrict reli-
gious exercise under this public policy).  
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privacy.75 Had the courts rejected constitutional sources of public pol-
icy, such extensive discussions would not have been necessary.  
 Given the uniform acceptance of statutory provisions as potential 
sources of the public policy, recognition of constitutional provisions 
has at least some intuitive appeal. After all, since statutes are “sub-
ordinate” to constitutional provisions, “it would make little sense” to 
draw upon the former but not the latter for guidance.76 
 Of course, at first glance, the argument for not drawing upon con-
stitutional sources in PPE cases is equally justifiable. Generally, con-
stitutional provisions are designed to restrict government behavior.77 
Arguably, constitutional principles are ill-suited to govern employ-
ment relations between private parties.78 It would make little sense, 
and would, perhaps, unduly restrict commerce, to make private em-
ployers abide by all the same requirements of procedural due process 
as a government employer.79 
 Based on this latter objection, courts in a few cases have flatly de-
clined to draw upon constitutional sources in examining PPE claims. 
In a series of cases, the Pennsylvania Superior Court rejected PPE 
claims based on constitutional sources of policy, at least where ap-
plied to private employers.80 One opinion emphasized that constitu-
                                                                                                                  
 75. See, e.g., Cort v. Bristol-Myers Co., 431 N.E.2d 908, 914 (Mass. 1982) (denying 
specific claim of wrongful discharge for failing to fill out employee questionnaire with ar-
guably unwarranted and intrusive questions because employee also refused to answer 
clearly relevant and warranted questions, but nonetheless recognizing that employee pri-
vacy rights limited the scope of questions for which refusal to answer constituted valid 
grounds for discharge).  
 76. Alfred & Clements, supra note 22, at 93-94.  
 77. See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 37, § 6.4 (examining the “state action doctrine” 
and indicating that the Constitution applies to the government and does not regulate pri-
vate conduct “no matter how discriminatory or how much [private wrongs] infringe funda-
mental rights”); see also Barr v. Kelso-Burnett Co., 478 N.E.2d 1354, 1356-57 (Ill. 1985) 
(stating that provisions of the Illinois Constitution mandate public policy protecting free 
speech restrict the actions of governmental or public officials, not of private employers); 
Hatfield v. Rochelle Coal Co., 813 P.2d 1308, 1311 (Wyo. 1991) (holding that “private em-
ployers are not subject to due process claims under their state constitutions for wrongful 
termination of employees”). 
 78. See Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 894, 903 (3d Cir. 1983) (Becker, J., 
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); Perritt, supra note 22, at 400-03 (articulating, 
but rejecting, this argument). 
 79. Cf. Turner, supra note 25, at 282 (“Our dinner invitations, marriage proposals, 
and even business ventures certainly must be immune to at least some of the constitutional 
law that requires public actors to afford equal treatment, due process, and respect for  
all viewpoints.”).  
 80. Veno v. Meredith, 515 A.2d 571, 578-81 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (rejecting on similar 
grounds a PPE claim by newspaper editor fired for publishing an article criticizing a 
judge); Martin v. Capital Cities Media, Inc., 511 A.2d 830, 843-45 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) 
(rejecting argument that free speech rights could form basis of a PPE claim against a pri-
vate employer); Cisco v. United Parcel Servs., Inc., 476 A.2d 1340, 1344 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1984) (rejecting presumption of innocence-based PPE claim and stating that constitutional 
rights were not meant to be “superimposed onto” one’s “remaining life experiences”). 
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tional provisions applied directly only to government conduct and not 
to disputes between private parties.81 Thus, the PPE claim did not 
apply because there had been no allegation of state action.82 
 Citing this line of cases, the Third Circuit (applying Pennsylvania 
law in a diversity case) declined to accept a PPE claim grounded, in 
part, on Fourth Amendment-based notions of privacy against a private 
employer, holding that the absence of state action was fatal to the use 
of constitutional principles in a wrongful discharge suit.83 Summariz-
ing its view of the Pennsylvania case law, the Third Circuit criticized 
the use of constitution-inspired PPE causes of action, suggesting a cer-
tain level of skepticism to any further use of constitutional principles 
in future applications of the PPE.84 For similar reasons, the Third Cir-
cuit reasoned, state constitutional principles were also ineligible as 
evidence of public policy in evaluating a PPE claim.85 
 Pennsylvania is not alone. At one point, the Supreme Court of 
West Virginia had stated, with respect to free speech-based PPE 
claims, that “[t]he prevailing view among the majority of courts ad-
dressing the issue” was that absent state action, “state or federal 
constitutional free speech cannot . . . be the basis of a PPE in wrong-
ful discharge claims.”86 This does not appear to be the majority view 
regarding free speech-based PPE claims today,87 and even West Vir-
ginia still allows theoretical consideration of constitutions in divining 
public policy under the PPE.88 But, a number of other states have ex-
plicitly rejected particular constitutional sources for the PPE in many 
instances, using language suggesting overall hostility to the transfer 
of constitutional policy norms to the private employment setting.89 
                                                                                                                  
 81. Booth v. McDonnell Douglas Truck Servs., Inc., 585 A.2d 24, 28 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991). 
 82. Id. 
 83. Borse v. Piece Goods Shop, Inc., 963 F.2d 611, 619 (3d Cir. 1992). 
 84. Id. at 618-20.  
 85. Id. at 620. 
 86. Tiernan v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc., 506 S.E.2d 578, 589 (W. Va. 1998). 
 87. See infra Part V.B.1. 
 88. See Wounaris v. W. Va. State Coll., 588 S.E.2d 406, 414 (W. Va. 2003) (noting the 
constitution as one of many sources for public policy for purposes of the PPE (citing 
Birthisel v. Tri-Cities Health Servs. Corp., 424 S.E.2d 606, 612 (W. Va. 1992))). 
 89. See Bruley v. Village Green Mgmt. Co., 592 F. Supp. 2d 1381, 1385 (M.D. Fla. 
2008) (“Florida has no exception even where termination is founded on an employee’s exer-
cise of constitutional rights.”); Deiters v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 842 F. Supp. 1023, 1027-
29 (M.D. Tenn. 1993) (declining to make the “open courts” provision of the Tennessee con-
stitution a basis for wrongful discharge claims because it did not apply to private employ-
ers, and further stating that even if the provision did apply to private employers, the con-
stitutional provision “does not clearly and unambiguously create a public policy which 
would prevent the discharge of at-will employees who sue their employers”); Hart v. Seven 
Resorts Inc., 947 P.2d 846, 850-51 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997) (rejecting the right of privacy as an 
appropriate basis for the PPE because such a right “applies only to intrusions 
by the government or where there is state action”); Edmondson v. Shearer Lumber Prods., 
75 P.3d 733, (Idaho 2003) (determining the constitutional right of free speech to be a source 
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 In some instances, the reasoning supporting such a rejection 
seems superficial. Some courts simply note authority requiring state 
action for liability under the Constitution, and then reject PPE 
claims where there is no state action. For example, the Kentucky Su-
preme Court once rejected a “freedom of association” basis for a 
wrongful discharge claim, citing United Brotherhood of Carpenters 
and Joiners of America v. Scott90 for the proposition that the right to 
free association applies only as against government action.91 
 But that seems to beg the question. No one asserts that direct con-
stitutional liability exists against private employers.92 The basis for 
liability is instead a common law cause of action which indisputably 
does regulate private action. The question is whether a constitutional 
right suggests a strongly held public policy which courts ought to up-
hold as against private employers under this common law claim. 
That question must be answered on some other basis besides the con-
clusion that a distinct constitutional claim would fail.  
 In like manner, courts adjudicating PPE claims often draw upon 
statutory sources for public policy, even under circumstances in 
which the employer has no direct liability under the statute.93 This 
may be because the statutes in question are criminal and provide for 
no civil liability; or because they apply only to larger employers; or 
because the employee’s claim is precluded by statute of limitations 
concerns; or for other reasons.94 Nonetheless, courts rely on the stat-
utes for the underlying public policy and then hold that the common 
law claim can be used to vindicate that public policy. The analysis is 
no different with respect to constitutional sources of public policy.95 
                                                                                                                  
of public policy when applied to state regulation only, and not in the context of private 
employment); McGarvey v. Key Prop. Mgmt., LLC, 211 P.3d 503 (Wyo. 2009) (rejecting free 
speech-based PPE claim while noting that no Wyoming case expressly endorsed application 
of Wyoming constitution to private entities).  
 90. 463 U.S. 825, 831-33 (1983). 
 91. Grzyb v. Evans, 700 S.W.2d 399, 402 (Ky. 1985). 
 92. But there are unusual instances in which a state constitution has been interpreted 
to restrict private action. See Kraslawsky v. Upper Deck Co., 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 297, 301-03 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (state constitutional guarantee of the right to pursue and obtain priva-
cy creates a right of action against private as well as government entities). Indeed, even 
the U.S. Constitution’s abolition of involuntary servitude restricts private actors. See U.S. 
CONST. amend. XIII. 
 93. See infra Part IV. 
 94. Id.  
 95. Even where a court has rejected constitutional provisions as a legitimate source of 
public policy in evaluating wrongful discharge claims, constitutional precedent may still 
inform the analysis. For example, after rejecting federal and state constitutional provisions 
as evidence of public policy, the Third Circuit analyzed the employee privacy claim under 
state tort law—but it used Supreme Court Fourth Amendment case law to evaluate the 
contours of the privacy interests at stake. Borse v. Piece Goods Shop, Inc., 963 F.2d 611, 
621 n.10 (3d Cir. 1992). 
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 A better argument against the use of constitutional sources is the 
“slippery slope” concern. As the Wisconsin Supreme Court put it, giv-
ing courts the authority to scour constitutions for employer-
restricting public policies would “open a Pandora’s box” of due pro-
cess and equal protection arguments which would “eliminate any dis-
tinction between private and governmental employment.”96 
 However, this concern seems overblown. It is uncontroversial for 
courts to look to the entirety of common law doctrine and all statutes 
within the state as sources of public policy. This is a very deep well of 
potential public policies to draw upon in deciding whether to add to 
the list of protections afforded employees. In comparison the incre-
mental increase in potential public policies, and thus potential extra 
employee protections, from allowing constitutional analysis would 
not seem to be that great. We would not be adding that much extra 
employee protection simply by allowing constitutional sources along 
with the already plentiful statutory and regulatory sources. This is 
particularly so where courts are circumspect about which constitu-
tional rights they will draw upon, and how broadly or narrowly they 
apply them, as this Article advocates.97 
 On balance, while the distinction between public and private set-
tings may justify some caution in drawing upon constitutional prin-
ciples for PPE purposes, it does not justify wholesale exclusion. Con-
stitutional principles are foundational. They often represent the most 
deeply held beliefs of a society, and enshrine our most cherished 
rights. Many of them are at least as important as the right to file a 
workers’ compensation claim, which almost all jurisdictions recognize 
as sufficiently important to form the basis of a PPE claim.98 Why 
would we not look to them when deciding what public policies are 
clear and substantial? The challenge is simply to decide when consti-
tutional policies governing public entities are sufficiently apt analo-
gies such that they can be logically related to a private setting. As 
one commentator put it in a different context, the question is “wheth-
er the values protected by declared rights are threatened by concen-
trated private power in a way fairly analogous to the threat presently 
or formerly posed by unlimited government power.”99 
                                                                                                                  
 96. See Bushko v. Miller Brewing Co., 396 N.W.2d 167, 172 (Wis. 1986) (rejecting a 
free speech-based PPE claim). 
 97. See infra Part V (discussing these questions and making recommendations).  
 98. Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 894, 899 (3d Cir. 1983) (making a 
similar observation).  
 99. See 1 JENNIFER FRIESEN, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: LITIGATING INDIVIDUAL 
RIGHTS, CLAIMS, AND DEFENSES § 9-2(b)(2) (3d ed. 2000).  
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B.   State versus Federal Constitutions 
 In determining the public policy underlying a PPE claim, some 
state courts make no distinction between federal and state constitu-
tional sources.100 Others expressly reference both federal and state 
constitutions. For example, in outlining the elements of the PPE, the 
Supreme Court of Ohio has listed the existence of a “clear public  
policy . . . manifested in a state or federal constitution, statute or ad-
ministrative regulation, or in the common law.”101 One of the broad-
est statements of sources of public policy lists, “among others:” 
our federal and state constitutions, our public statutes, our judi-
cial decisions, the applicable principles of the common law,  
the acknowledged prevailing concepts of the federal and state 
governments relating to and affecting the safety, health, morals 
and general welfare of the people for whom government . . . is 
factually established.102 
 On the other hand, a few courts have looked to state constitutions 
but not to the federal constitution. For example, the Supreme Court 
of Illinois referred specifically (and only) to the state constitution 
when listing potential sources for the public policy.103 
 Others take a more nuanced approach. For example, in Oklahoma, 
federal statutes, standing alone, cannot provide the public policy that 
triggers the exception, because the exception is geared toward state 
policy.104 But Oklahoma would not preclude the use of the PPE to 
protect an employee who reports the defrauding of a federal govern-
ment program in violation of a federal statute, where such fraud also 
would be subject to criminal or civil penalties under Oklahoma law.105 
Further, a federal constitutional provision can provide such policy 
guidance if it “prescribes a norm of conduct for the state.”106 
 This Oklahoma doctrine actually points the way toward the ap-
propriate approach on this question. The better view is not to require 
that the policy be formulated by an agent of that state’s government, 
but rather to require simply that the public policy does indeed apply 
within that state, regardless of its original source. The PPE is a 
                                                                                                                  
 100. See, e.g., Borse, 963 F.2d at 618-20 (rejecting both federal and state constitutional 
provisions as evidence of public policy for the PPE). 
 101. Dohme v. Eurand Am., Inc., 956 N.E.2d 825, 829 (Ohio 2011) (emphasis added). 
 102. Birthisel v. Tri-Cities Health Servs. Corp., 424 S.E.2d 606, 611 (W. Va. 1992) 
(quoting Allen v. Com. Cas. Ins. Co., 37 A.2d 37, 39 (N.J. 1944) (emphasis added)).  
 103. Turner v. Mem’l Med. Ctr., 911 N.E.2d 369, 374 (Ill. 2009) (quoting Palmateer v. 
Int’l Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 878 (Ill. 1981)). 
 104. Darrow v. Integris Health, Inc., 176 P.3d 1204, 1212 (Okla. 2008). 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
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common law doctrine applied by state courts; in evaluating a PPE 
claim, it is only sensible to look to laws and policies which apply 
within that state.  
 This approach suggests a distinction among different constitu-
tional provisions as inspiration for a PPE claim. It would allow the 
use of only those individual rights from the federal constitution that 
have been “incorporated,” i.e., applied to the States through the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.107 
C.   Treating Private Action as State Action 
 A separate ground for importing constitutional principles into 
PPE claims might be cases where the private action could be viewed 
legitimately as tantamount to state action. In constitutional law, 
there are well-recognized exceptions to the state action doctrine that 
allow courts to treat action by private entities as state action. In sum, 
courts may do so when (1) the private entity is engaging in a public 
function;108 (2) public and private entities are intertwined in a close 
relationship;109 or (3) government ratifies and adopts the action of the 
private entity.110 
 The best example of the “public function” exception is primary 
elections. Political parties run these elections, but they nonetheless 
engage in a public function while doing so. Courts have thus held 
they are bound by equal protection restrictions on discrimination.111 
                                                                                                                  
 107. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3042 (2010) (discussing the in-
corporation doctrine). The Supreme Court has held most of the individual rights guaran-
teed by the Bill of Rights to be “incorporated” and applicable to the States, although some 
have never been addressed by the Court. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 37, § 16.3 (discussing 
the “selective incorporation” doctrine). The Court has specifically declined to incorporate 
the Fifth Amendment right to a grand jury and the Seventh Amendment right to a jury 
trial in civil lawsuits. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 687 (1972) (Fifth Amendment 
right to Grand Jury not incorporated); Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. Co. v. Bombolis , 241 
U.S. 211, 217 (1916) (Seventh Amendment right to civil jury trial not incorporated); see 
also McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3035 n.13 (providing the latest statement by the Court of the 
status of selective incorporation doctrine). Thus, even if the grand jury or civil jury trial 
rights could sensibly and feasibly be applied to private employers under the PPE, see infra 
Part V.A.3, they would be poor candidates for the PPE.  
 108. See, e.g., Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 469-70 (1953) (finding state action where 
private political party ran primary election). 
 109. See, e.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961) (finding 
that where government agency leased space to private parking authority, it created “inter-
dependence” and “joint partnership” in the challenged discrimination sufficient to establish 
state action).  
 110. See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1948) (finding state action where 
court enforced racially restrictive covenant in private deed).  
 111. See, e.g., Terry, 345 U.S. at 469-70 (1953) (designating a private group’s running of 
a statewide primary election as state action for purposes of constitutional limitations on 
race discrimination); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 663-65 (1944) (declaring a private 
political party’s racially discriminatory motives in conducting a primary election to be un-
constitutional because it was operating under statutory authority of the state). 
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Courts also have found state action present under this category in 
older cases involving “company towns,” settlements owned and oper-
ated by a corporation but that functioned as municipalities for the 
employee residents, with the company maintaining streets, providing 
sanitation, and the like.112  
 The second category arose in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Au-
thority, which involved a government agency that leased space to a 
private company running a parking lot.113 The Court noted that the 
government agency stood to profit from the racial discrimination be-
ing committed by the private company.114 Thus, the Court reasoned, 
the two entities were “interdependen[t],” with the government essen-
tially a “joint participant” in the discrimination.115 State action was 
therefore present.116 
 The final category first arose in a case where a court was called 
upon to enforce a racially discriminatory restrictive covenant in a 
dispute between two private parties.117 The Court held that the trial 
court’s action to enforce the covenant amounted to ratification of the 
discrimination and thus state action.118 
 This line of authority may inform courts’ decisions as to when to 
use constitutional principles in enforcing the PPE. Where the private 
employer is engaging in a public function, as in a private prison, the 
argument may be stronger that it should afford its employees consti-
tutional rights comparable to those enjoyed by public employees. 
Courts also might be more open to such arguments where the private 
employer is a monopoly, wielding the kind of power analogous to that 
of the government.119 Analogizing from the second category, the same 
                                                                                                                  
 112. See, e.g., Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 507-08 (1946) (enforcing First and 
Fourteenth Amendment rights for a woman distributing religious material in a company-
owned suburb because it was accessible to the public and functioned as any other town 
within the community); cf. Citizens to End Animal Suffering & Exploitation, Inc. v. Faneuil 
Hall Marketplace, Inc., 745 F. Supp. 65, (D. Mass. 1990) (holding that a private corporation 
could not regulate free speech activities on land it had leased from city because the land 
was a public forum for public use). 
 113. 365 U.S. 715 (1961). 
 114. Id. at 725. 
 115. Id.  
 116. Id. The continuing vitality of Burton is under serious question, and its holding 
may be sharply limited to its facts or else to the specific situation of private commercial 
leasing of government property. Lebron v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 409 
(1995) (citing L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 18-3, at 1701 n.13 (2d ed. 1988)). 
 117. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
 118. Id. at 18-20. 
 119. Turner, supra note 25, at 292-93, 317 (2013) (arguing that private action should be 
treated as state action where the private entity enjoys a monopoly). This argument makes 
sense from a market perspective. Where an employer effectively holds a monopoly within a 
particular job market, employees have markedly limited ability to seek employment with a 
competitor if they consider employee policies too rights-restrictive. See Gay Law Students 
Ass'n v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 595 P.2d 592, 595 (Cal. 1979) (making this observation). 
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result may be obtained if the private employer is a government con-
tractor whose operations are closely intertwined with those of gov-
ernment, as are some military contractors engaged in combat opera-
tions with U.S. armed forces.120 Finally, where the government is 
asked to enforce a problematic rule of a private employer—for exam-
ple, an overly speech- or privacy-restrictive rule that provides not 
only for termination, but also allows the employer to claim some re-
imbursement of recently accrued business expenses from the employ-
ee—courts may be less willing to affirmatively enforce such provi-
sions if the employer sues the employee, and be less willing to coun-
tenance the discharge in the first place if called upon by the employer 
to do so.   
IV.   THE RELEVANCE OF EXISTING STATUTORY REMEDIES 
 In evaluating the eligibility of constitutional provisions as sources 
for the public policy behind the application of the PPE, one issue 
bound to emerge is the applicability (if any) of statutory remedies for 
the kind of wrongful discharge at issue. This is a double-edged sword. 
On the one hand, the existence of relevant statutes covering the same 
or similar types of alleged wrongful discharge provides powerful evi-
dence that the related constitutional provision does indeed express a 
strongly held, substantial, and clear public policy. On the other hand, 
the existence of statutory remedies might suggest that the PPE 
would be unnecessary.121 
 However, there are a number of instances in which a PPE claim 
might be needed, even where a statutory claim exists covering the 
same general grounds for termination. For example, the availability 
of the PPE drawing upon constitutional principles is a relevant con-
cern in those cases where the employee is precluded from pursuing a 
statutory claim by missing a limitations period,122 failing to exhaust 
administrative remedies,123 or working for an employer with too few 
                                                                                                                  
 120. Of course, one rationale for using such private security forces is their ability to act 
without constitutional restraints. But that very ability has become highly controversial. 
See Earl. F. Martin, America’s Anti-Standing Army Tradition and the Separate Community 
Doctrine, 76 MISS. L.J. 135, 135 (2006) (analyzing the “separate community doctrine” to 
highlight the uncertain balance between civilian society and the armed forces). 
 121. Cf. Borden v. Johnson, 395 S.E.2d 628, 630 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990) (refusing to recog-
nize the PPE for dismissal based on gender or pregnancy due to a lack of state or federal 
statutes specifically addressing such rights). 
 122. Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), employees must file an 
EEOC complaint within 180 days of discovering the alleged discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(e) (2012). Once the EEOC either fails to respond within 180 days or issues a “right to sue” 
letter, the employee then must file a complaint in federal court within ninety days. § 2000e-5(f). 
 123. Rojo v. Kliger, 801 P.2d 373, 389 (Cal. 1990) (allowing PPE claim to proceed where 
plaintiff was barred from analogous statutory claim for failing to exhaust administrative 
remedies); see also Midgett v. Sackett-Chicago, Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1280, 1285 (Ill. 1984) (col-
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employees to trigger coverage under the statute.124 Yet another ex-
ample would be where the common law claim provides for needed 
remedies that are not provided for under the corresponding statute.125 
 This latter problem of employer size may be a relatively common 
occurrence, since most United States employers have five or fewer 
employees126 and thus would be outside the scope of many federal and 
state employment antidiscrimination statutes. Indeed, state courts 
have recognized PPE claims in exactly such circumstances.127 But, 
there is still significant variation among the states as to whether PPE 
claims should go forward against employers too small to be covered by 
the applicable statute, with some states rejecting such PPE claims.128 
 Statute of limitations issues are another salient example. Limita-
tion periods for PPE claims vary. Generally, limitation periods for 
common law tort claims range from one to three years.129 States have 
                                                                                                                  
lective bargaining agreement requirement that employees go through internal grievance 
procedure did not bar PPE claim, since the latter sounded in tort and not contract). 
 124. See § 2000e(b) (defining an employer for purposes of Title VII as one with fifteen 
or more employees); Thurdin v. SEI Bos., LLC, 895 N.E.2d 446, 448-49, 455, 455 n.18 
(Mass. 2008) (discussing alternate liability theory of, inter alia, PPE where state pregnan-
cy antidiscrimination statute applied only to employers with more than six employees); 
Roberts v. Dudley, 993 P.2d 901, 909-11 (Wash. 2000) (allowing PPE claim based on sex 
discrimination to proceed against small business where state sex antidiscrimination stat-
ute exempted small employers). 
 125. Even if a PPE claim was necessary to assist a particular employee plaintiff for one 
of these reasons, it might suffice for the court to draw upon the existing statutes for inspi-
ration as to the nature of the clear public policy, avoiding reference to constitutional prin-
ciples as unnecessary. But because there is no good reason for treating constitutional 
sources as somehow inferior to statutory ones in divining public policy, see supra Part 
III.A., it seems unwise for a court to wear such blinders.  
 126. According to 2012 Census Bureau estimates, in nine of the ten most populous 
states, the majority of employers have fewer than five employees. See Firm Size Data, U.S. 
SMALL BUS. ADMIN., http://www.sba.gov/advocacy/849/12162 (last visited Feb. 16, 2014) 
(spreadsheet based on census data for California, Texas, New York, Florida, Illinois, Penn-
sylvania, Ohio, Georgia, Michigan, and North Carolina). 
 127. See, e.g., Thurdin v. SEI Bos., LLC, 895 N.E.2d 446, 448-449 n.18 (Mass. 2008) 
(discussing alternative liability theory of, inter alia, PPE where state pregnancy antidis-
crimination statute applied only to employers with more than six employees); Badih v. 
Myers, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 229 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (recognizing PPE claim involving 
pregnancy discrimination, even though employer had fewer than the five individuals re-
quired to be covered by the analogous anti-discrimination statute); Molesworth v. Brandon, 
672 A.2d 608 (Md. 1996) (ruling in like manner regarding sex discrimination); Collins v. 
Rizkana, 652 N.E.2d 653 (Ohio 1995) (same, for sexual harassment PPE claim); Roberts, 
993 P.2d at 901 (same, for pregnancy discrimination); Williamson v. Greene, 490 S.E.2d 23 
(W. Va. 1997) (same, for sex discrimination and harassment).  
 128. See Thibodeau v. Design Grp. One Architects, LLC, 802 A.2d 731, 745-46 (Conn. 
2002) (declining to find PPE extended to pregnancy-related discrimination by employers 
with fewer than the three employees required by statute, and explicitly stating that com-
mon law doctrines could not trump such statutory exemptions); Weaver v. Harpster, 975 
A.2d 555, 567 (Pa. 2009) (declining to find employee’s sex discrimination claims actionable 
under PPE because workplace employed fewer than four employees, the amount required 
to invoke remedy under Pennsylvania Human Relations Act).   
 129. PERRITT, supra note 32, § 9.15. 
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adopted a similar range for PPE claims, applying limitation periods 
of at least one year, and often up to three years.130 Because some 
state and federal antidiscrimination statutes involve requirements 
that the complainant file a claim in a shorter time period,131 there 
may be situations in which an employee victim of discrimination, who 
otherwise might have pursued a typical discrimination claim, may 
need to pursue a PPE claim instead.132 
 Further, states vary as to whether the limitation period begins to 
run when the termination actually occurs, when the employee re-
ceives notice of termination, or at the moment the employer decides 
to terminate.133 Again, where this deviates from the rule regarding an 
analogous statutory claim, a PPE claim may be viable where the 
statutory claim may no longer be viable. Thus, in a few jurisdictions 
courts have allowed a common law action based on public policy to 
proceed, even if the limitations period of the relevant employment 
antidiscrimination statute has expired.134 
                                                                                                                  
 130. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-248 (2013) (two years for Virginia); Kamen v. Int’l 
Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 505 F. Supp. 2d 66, 78 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (three years for D.C., under 
the “catch-all” statute of limitations); Funk v. Sperry Corp., 842 F.2d 1129, 1133 (9th Cir. 
1988) (California PPE limitation period of one year); Holien v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 689 
P.2d 1292, 1301 (Or. 1984) (two years for Oregon); Barnett v. Sequim Valley Ranch, LLC, 
302 P.3d 500, 505 (Wash. Ct. App. 2013) (three years for Washington). 
 131. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (2012) (six months for unfair labor practice claims 
under the NLRA); 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (2006) (same, for ADEA claims); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(e) (2012) (depending on state, federal Title VII claims must be filed within six to ten 
months); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.02(N) (West 2013) (six months to file age discrimi-
nation claim); TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-50-103 (West 2009) (six months to file employment 
discrimination claim).  
 132. For some types of PPE claims, though, this may not matter. When a federal claim 
does not have an express statute of limitation, federal courts adopt the statute of limita-
tions of an analogous state law claim, unless doing so would interfere with the substantive 
policy behind the federal claim. DelCostello v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 158 
(1983). But for all federal statutory causes of action-based laws passed after 1990, Con-
gress has adopted a “catch-all” limitations period of four years. 28 U.S.C. § 1658 (2012). 
 133. Compare Stupek v. Wyle Labs. Corp., 963 P.2d 678, 682 (Or. 1998) (determining 
that limitation began to run when termination became effective), and Lorenz v. Martin 
Marietta Corp., 802 P.2d 1146, 1149 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990) (same), with Huff v. Great W. 
Seed Co., 885 P.2d 723, 726 (Or. Ct. App. 1994) (finding that one-year statute of limitations 
began to run when plaintiff found out her dismissal was related to her workers’ compensa-
tion claim, not the date of actual termination).  
 134. See, e.g., Wendeln v. Beatrice Manor, Inc., 712 N.W.2d 226, 238 (Neb. 2006) (con-
cluding that public policy-based retaliatory discharge claim based in tort was governed by 
the general four-year statute of limitations period found in NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-207 (2004) 
rather than employment discrimination claim under the NFEPA); Klopfenstein v. NK 
Parts Indus., Inc., 870 N.E.2d 741, 747 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007) (finding at-will employee’s 
independent claim for wrongful discharge was governed by general four-
year statute of limitations rather than one-year statute of limitations for claims brought 
under the workers’ compensation anti-retaliation statute); Pytlinski v. Brocar Prods., Inc., 
760 N.E.2d 385, 388-89 (Ohio 2002) (applying general four-year limitations period to an 
independent cause of action based in common law for violation of public policy where em-
ployee’s OSHA complaint was otherwise barred by the 180-day limitations period of the 
Ohio Whistleblower Act).  
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 Similarly, a PPE claim may be relevant despite the existence of an 
analogous statutory claim, because the two claims may involve dif-
ferent potential remedies.135 When an analogous statutory cause of 
action allows for administrative remedies, courts have still recog-
nized an independent cause of action for the public policy claim.136 
 Of course, even if there are procedural or remedial reasons why an 
employee needs to bring a PPE claim, despite the existence of a stat-
utory claim protecting the same type of employee behavior, the  
jurisdiction may not be willing to allow the PPE claim to proceed.  
After all, there are reasons why jurisdictions bar antidiscrimination 
statutes’ coverage of firms with fewer than the minimum number  
of employees. One is to limit the drain on enforcement resources of 
the courts, the EEOC, and similar state enforcement agencies.137 An-
other is to limit the hardship on small “mom and pop” operations, 
which may be more vulnerable to the burdens of regulation and liti-
gation.138 Although the first concern does not really apply with re-
spect to judicial enforcement of a common law PPE claim, the second 
policy rationale does.  
 Similarly, there are reasons why we have statutes of limitations: 
ensuring certainty and finality, saving defendants from abusive liti-
gation, and saving courts from adjudicating stale claims with fading 
evidence.139 These concerns simply do not go away when the plaintiff 
pursues a common law PPE claim. Title VII, like many state antidis-
crimination statutes, requires administrative procedures for similar 
logistical, screening, and judicial economy reasons.140 To the extent 
                                                                                                                  
 135. See Roberts v. Dudley, 993 P.2d 901, 909-11 (Wash. 2000) (en banc) (holding that 
statutory claim, but not wrongful discharge claim, provided for administrative proceedings 
and potential attorney’s fee remedies). 
 136. See, e.g., Holien v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 689 P.2d 1292, 1303-04 (Or. 1984) (deter-
mining a female employee was entitled to common law tort damages based on sexual har-
assment because the equitable remedies available through employment antidiscrimination 
statute were inadequate to compensate plaintiff for the personal nature of her injuries). 
 137. See LARSON, supra note 29, § 174.06[3] (discussing divergence of court decisions on 
this question, and reasons for and against allowing PPE claim to proceed).  
 138. Id.; see also Thibodeau v. Design Grp. One Architects, LLC, 802 A.2d 731, 740-41 
(Conn. 2002) (affirming that the primary purpose of exempting small employers from em-
ployment discrimination claims is to avoid subjecting such employers to the significant 
financial burdens of litigation). Aside from regulatory burden, there is also the more ab-
stract libertarian concern regarding such “mom and pop” firms, which often involve a more 
intimate setting raising greater “freedom of association” issues. See infra Part V.B.1.  
 139. See John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 133 (2008) (stating 
that the primary purpose of most statutes of limitations is “to protect defendants against 
stale or unduly delayed claims”).  
 140. See Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2012); see also, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-
1463 (2013) (prohibiting employers from hiring, segregating, or classifying employees on 
the basis of “race, color, religion, sex, age or national origin or on the basis of disability”); 
NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-1104(1) (2012) (declaring discrimination on the basis of “race, color, 
religion, sex, disability, marital status, or national origin” an unlawful employment prac-
tice); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 659A.030 (2013) (stating it unlawful to “refuse to hire or em-
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that the coverage, time limitation, and administrative exhaustion 
provisions of these statutes leave “gaps” that are conscious policy de-
terminations rather than oversights, there may be sound policy rea-
sons for rejecting PPE claims in such situations.141 
 Thus, where the same type of employee behavior may be protected 
by both claims, courts may prefer to hold that the statutory remedy 
renders unnecessary the common law claim, both to show deference 
to the legislative branch and also to honor the common law  
presumption of at-will employment. A court could thus hold that the 
statute exhaustively outlines the manner in which such employee 
rights are vindicated.142 
 However, such seeming “preemption” appears not to be the major-
ity approach. Those courts that have addressed the issue have tended 
to say that the existence of a statutory remedy protecting the same 
type of employee conduct does not bar a PPE claim, at least where 
that statute is not the sole source for the clear public policy the court 
derives in recognizing a PPE claim under those facts.143 Instead, 
courts will look to see if there is any indication of legislative intent 
that the statutory remedy, or remedies, provided were designed to 
replace, rather than supplement, preexisting common law remedies 
like the PPE. In the absence of such indication, the common law 
cause of action continues.144 Therefore, where, in a given case, the 
statutory remedy is unavailable due to some procedural or coverage 
                                                                                                                  
ploy . . . bar or discharge” any individual from employment on the basis of “race, color, reli-
gion, sex, sexual orientation, national origin, marital status or age”).  
 141. For an excellent discussion of these issues, see LARSON, supra note 
29, §§ 174.06[2]-.06[4]. 
 142. See Parlato v. Abbott Labs., 850 F.2d 203, 206-07 (4th Cir. 1988) (dismissing 
plaintiff’s common law claims for wrongful discharge based on race and age because statu-
tory remedy already existed); Rupp v. Purolator Courier Corp., 790 F. Supp. 1069, 1073 (D. 
Kan. 1992) (Title VII and the Kansas Act Against Discrimination provided exclusive reme-
dies for employee's common-law claims of retaliation, constructive discharge and whistle-
blowing); Northrup v. Farmland Indus., 372 N.W.2d 193, 197 (Iowa 1985) (stating that “the 
procedure under the civil rights act is exclusive, and a claimant asserting a discriminatory 
practice must pursue the remedy provided by the act”).  
 143. Phillips v. J.P. Stevens & Co., Inc., 827 F. Supp. 349, 352-53 (M.D.N.C. 1993) (rec-
ognizing that the availability of statutory remedy does not affect the availability of an al-
ternative wrongful discharge claim); Collins v. Rizkana, 652 N.E.2d 653, 660 (Ohio 1995) 
(noting that a statute will not preempt common law remedies unless it is the sole source of 
the public policy); Atkinson v. Halliburton Co., 905 P.2d 772, 774 (Okla. 1995) (quoting 
Tate v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 833 P.2d 1218, 1226 (Okla. 1992)) (“[W]here the common law 
gives a remedy, and another is provided by statute, the latter is merely cumulative, unless 
the statute declares it to be exclusive”). 
 144. See Collins, 652 N.E.2d at 660; Atkinson, 905 P.2d at 774. Of course, the legisla-
ture can also make express its intent to allow a parallel common law cause of action con-
tinued viability. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:19-14 (West 2013) (allowing plaintiff to 
choose between suing under statute or under common law public policy claim). 
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problem, the common law PPE tort can fill in the gap.145 This result 
can also be obtained where the analogous statutory claim is based on 
a federal statute.146 
 A number of courts taking this approach have tended to allow PPE 
claims to go forward despite parallel statutory remedies. For example, 
the Kentucky Supreme Court recently acknowledged that a statute 
protecting employees’ rights to bear arms explicitly recognized a civil 
cause of action, yet it also held that an employer’s violation of the stat-
ute violated a wider public policy, thus creating a PPE cause of ac-
tion.147 Indeed, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin has explained that in 
deciding whether a clear public policy exists, courts should not focus on 
the “literal language” of a statutory provision or the circumstances it 
describes but should examine whether the employer “contravene[d] the 
spirit as well as the letter of a constitutional, statutory, or administra-
tive provision.”148 Thus, courts have allowed PPE claims to go forward 
despite the existence of a comparable statutory claim.149 
 The above approaches—leaning away from a general “preemption” 
rule where statutory language exists, and declining to hold that the 
absence of such statutory language definitively excludes the recogni-
tion of a common law PPE claim—make sense, for reasons similar to 
                                                                                                                  
 145. See, e.g., Thibodeau v. Design Grp. One Architects, LLC, 802 A.2d 731, 733 (Conn. 
2002) (recognizing a PPE where a female employee was fired for missing work due to preg-
nancy even though she was one of two employees and the statutory remedy applied only to 
employers with three or more employees); Mitchell v. Univ. of Ky., 366 S.W.3d 895, 903 
(Ky. 2012) (allowing claim for wrongful discharge based on gun ownership despite analo-
gous statutory claim).  
 146. Wheeler v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 485 N.E.2d 372, 375-76 (Ill. 1985) (holding that 
the federal nuclear safety statute with whistleblower protection provision did not preempt 
state law PPE claim).  
 147. Mitchell, 366 S.W.3d at 903. 
 148. Strozinsky v. Sch. Dist. of Brown Deer, 614 N.W.2d 443, 455 (Wis. 2000) (quota-
tion marks omitted). 
 149. Phillips v. J.P. Stevens & Co., Inc., 827 F. Supp. 349, 352-53 (M.D.N.C. 1993) (recog-
nizing that the availability of statutory remedy does not affect the availability of an alterna-
tive wrongful discharge claim); Collins v. Rizkana, 652 N.E.2d 653, 660 (Ohio 1995) (noting 
that a statute will not preempt common law remedies unless it is the sole source of the public 
policy); Atkinson, 905 P.2d at 774 (quoting Tate v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 833 P.2d 1218, 1226 
(Okla. 1992)) (“[W]here the common law gives a remedy, and another is provided by statute, 
the latter is merely cumulative, unless the statute declares it to be exclusive.”).  
  The converse is also true: the absence of statutory language barring the kind of 
conduct at issue does not necessarily preclude recognition of the PPE.  Though a court 
could take an expressio unius est exclusio alterius approach and infer a decision to exclude 
other common law remedies where a statutory remedy exists, courts do not seem to do so. 
Payne v. Rozendaal, 520 A.2d 586, 588 (Vt. 1986) (recognizing PPE cause of action for age 
discrimination even though termination occurred prior to the passage of state legislation 
barring such discrimination).  
  This approach is sensible. At bottom, the question is a straightforward one of 
statutory construction. Sometimes the legislature intended to “preempt” common law caus-
es of action, and sometimes it did not. Courts can, of course, use tools of statutory construc-
tion to divine legislative intent 
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the continued recognition of common law causes of action in the first 
place. The legislature cannot anticipate all potential situations when 
drafting statutory language. Case-by-case, incremental development 
of legal doctrine is useful for that reason and also because it provides 
the flexibility needed for adapting older principles to new situations. 
These new situations emerge constantly, and the legislature cannot 
always keep up.  
 Such judicial latitude is nonetheless consistent with the general 
preference for having the legislature make the kinds of policy  
decisions involved in formulating a PPE.150 Where the legislature in-
tends a statutory remedy to be exhaustive and exclusive of common 
law remedies, it need only say so explicitly to prevent judicial over-
reach. Such language effectively preempts otherwise applicable 
common law causes of action.151 The legislature also can assert such 
preeminence after the fact: when a court applies an overly broad 
PPE, the legislature may legislatively overrule the decision with 
proper preemption language.152  
 Also, recognition of PPE claims based in whole or in significant 
part on constitutional principles may be especially appropriate. After 
all, constitutional principles are foundational. They are designed to 
supersede statutory and regulatory principles. And by its very na-
                                                                                                                  
 150. See, e.g., Borden v. Johnson, 395 S.E.2d 628, 629 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990) (discussing 
the court’s precedent resting on the principle that the legislature is the body most qualified 
to set public policy for purposes of interpreting the PPE); Horn v. N.Y. Times, 790 N.E.2d 
753, 756-57 (N.Y. 2003) (same). 
 151. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN § 23-1501B (West 2012) (remedies provided for in 
statutes creating liability for wrongful discharge at the sole and exclusive remedies for 
vindicating any “public policy . . . arising out of the statute”). 
 152. Analogizing once again from constitutional principles, courts can also find “im-
plied preemption” in some circumstances. Where the state has so pervasively regulated in 
an area to create an inference that it intended to “cover the field,” courts may decide that 
the existence of statutory remedies for a given situation may indeed crowd out a PPE 
claim. Similarly, where the recognition of a PPE claim would stand as a substantial “obsta-
cle” to the fulfillment of the legislature’s underlying policy in an area, courts may infer a 
different category of implied preemption. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 
2502-03 (2012) (describing “field” and “obstacle” preemption).  
  For the reasons stated immediately above, these kinds of “implied preemptions” of 
PPE claims should not be the norm. Nor do they seem to be the existing norm, according to 
the case law. See supra notes 143-149 and accompanying text. The mere existence of a 
statutory remedy based on a comparable ground for termination need not create a negative 
inference of an intent to have such ground be the sole remedy. The law is filled with exam-
ples of parallel statutory and common law remedies, and having alternate theories of liabil-
ity can serve a salutary purpose. Nonetheless, there may indeed be especially compelling 
occasions where legislative history, statutory purpose, or the overall structure of the statu-
tory scheme in a given state evince a legislative purpose to crowd out all common law 
claims, or at least PPE claims, even in the absence of express preemption language in the 
statutes. Allowing courts the ability to recognize such “implied preemption” provides need-
ed flexibility. It also provides adequate deference to legislative prerogatives, effectively 
rebutting criticisms that recognition of a PPE cause of action parallel to an analogous stat-
utory remedy represents judicial usurpation. 
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ture, PPE liability exists only when the public policy at issue is both 
clear and substantial. If any public policy deserves vindication even 
when the facts place it in a “gap” within the statutory framework, it 
would be a policy that is clear, substantial, and foundational.  
 In sum, the existence of statutory remedies for comparable em-
ployer actions involving similar public policies may or may not war-
rant precluding a supplemental PPE claim. Reasonable arguments 
exist on both sides. Resolution of the question should most appropri-
ately turn on the specifics of the intent of the legislature which 
passed the statute in question: whether it intended to supplant or 
supplement common law remedies.153 But at least where such reme-
dies do not “crowd out” the PPE, courts should still be able to look to 
constitutional as well as statutory sources of authority.  
V.   SPECIFIC CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AS CANDIDATES FOR THE 
PPE  
 If constitutional provisions can indeed inform a court’s analysis of 
the prevailing public policy under the PPE, which types of constitu-
tional provisions can most properly fill that function? Are there any 
constitutional doctrines that are particularly appropriate, or inap-
propriate, for this role?154 To begin to answer this question, this Arti-
cle uses provisions of the U.S. Constitution as examples, keeping in 
mind that state constitutions often have analogous provisions.155 
                                                                                                                  
 153. See supra note 144 and accompanying text. 
 154. One overarching consideration might be the constitutional standard of review 
applied when evaluating alleged deprivations of a specific constitutional right. Obviously, 
the higher the standard of review, the more important the right, and therefore, the strong-
er the employee’s argument for the PPE. Most constitutional claims of alleged deprivations 
of individual rights are evaluated using (from most lenient to most exacting) “rational ba-
sis” review, “intermediate scrutiny,” or “strict scrutiny.” 3 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. 
NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 18.3(a)(v) (4th 
ed. 2008). In most of the examples considered infra Parts V.B-C, as potential candidates for 
the PPE, the applicable standard is either “strict scrutiny,” e.g., free speech, or “intermedi-
ate scrutiny,” e.g., gender discrimination. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 570 
(1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court applies intermediate scrutiny in gen-
der discrimination cases); Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 
45 (1983) (“For the state to enforce a content-based exclusion it must show that its regulation 
is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that 
end.” (citing Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461 (1980)). In a few cases, the standard of review 
is outside the traditional three tiers of constitutional review (abortion) or still undefined (the 
Second Amendment). See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3046-48 (2010) (ap-
plying individual Second Amendment right to bear arms to the states but failing to specify a 
particular standard of review); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 869 
(1992) (applying unique “undue burden” standard for abortion rights). 
 155. See, e.g., W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 7 (“No law abridging the freedom of speech, or 
of the press, shall be passed.”). 
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A.   Provisions that Should Not Form the Basis of a PPE Claim 
 1.   “Structural” Constitutional Doctrines 
 There are certain types of constitutionally based policies which 
are obviously inappropriate sources for the PPE. Some are structural 
policies that do not implicate individual rights and would thus afford 
no basis in drawing an analogy with respect to the interests of an in-
dividual employee fired from her job. For example, the doctrine of 
separation of powers is a well-respected, longstanding policy that is 
arguably both substantial and clear.156 But no terminated employee 
could plausibly claim her termination violated this policy. The same 
is true with respect to the doctrine of federalism.  
 2.   Restrictions Uniquely Focused on Government 
 Similarly, inherent in Establishment Clause doctrine is the idea 
that it is only the government, not private entities that may not en-
dorse religion.157 While as a legal matter, all federal constitutional 
provisions restrict only government action, the Establishment 
Clause, by its very nature, focuses uniquely on government action. 
Thus, the doctrine stands in contrast to constitutional provisions 
guaranteeing individual rights of privacy, free speech, or nondiscrim-
ination, all of which can easily be analogized to a private setting.  
 True, one could imagine situations in which a terminated employ-
ee might coherently invoke the values affirmed by this Clause: say, a 
Jewish employee fired for objecting to a “Keep Christ in Christmas” 
sign outside a workplace, to printing Christian Bible verses on all 
                                                                                                                  
 156. Actually, while the existence of a separation of powers doctrine is clear, its con-
tours are not. See ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 154, § 3.12(a) (describing the concept of 
separation of powers as one that evades “precise legal definition” and often provides nebu-
lous solutions to intra-governmental disputes); see also Martin H. Redish & Elizabeth J. 
Cisar, “If Angels Were to Govern”: The Need for Pragmatic Formalism in Separation of 
Powers Theory, 41 DUKE L.J. 449, 450 (1991) (characterizing the modern court’s treatment 
of the doctrine as “something of a split personality,” seemingly wavering from strict and 
“formalistic” to the use of a lenient, “functional” approach). The uncertain state of the law 
in this area is beyond the scope of this piece.  
 157. See Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Schs. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990) 
(explaining that: (1) the Establishment Clause forbids only government speech endorsing 
religion, while private speech endorsing religion is actually constitutionally protected; and 
(2) that “there is a crucial difference between government speech endorsing religion, which 
the Establishment Clause forbids, and private speech endorsing religion, which the Free 
Speech and Free Exercise Clauses protect”); Cooper v. U.S. Postal Serv., 577 F.3d 479, 484 
(2d Cir. 2009) (affirming an Establishment Clause violation only where religious material 
was displayed on postal units serving a public function, but declaring the private business 
surrounding in which the units operated free from such restrictions); Ams. United for Sep-
aration of Church & St. v. City of Grand Rapids, 980 F.2d 1538, 1553 (6th Cir. 1992) (hold-
ing that a private organization’s menorah display in a public forum did not constitute an 
endorsement of religion for purposes of Establishment Clause restrictions). 
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paychecks, or to holding weekly Christian evangelical rallies on em-
ployer premises. Indeed, at a certain point, such situations might 
trigger employer liability for religious harassment under Title VII or 
analogous state antidiscrimination statutes.158 But applying a “no 
endorsement of religion” restriction on a private employer seems 
overly intrusive. Indeed, a court order preventing an employer from 
endorsing religion would likely violate the employer’s rights under 
the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses.159 
 Certainly, one might have legitimate concerns about an abusive 
employer coercing employees into engaging in unwelcome religious 
observances or preventing employees from engaging in their own 
non-disruptive religious practices. Can the employer require its Jew-
ish employee to attend Christian services, make him sport a “Keep 
Christ in Christmas” button, or prevent him from wearing a yarmul-
ke? But such concerns can be addressed adequately by reliance on the 
Free Exercise Clause, discussed below, which is indeed designed to 
protect individual rights.160 Thus, the Establishment Clause makes a 
poor candidate for a source of public policy underlying a PPE claim.  
 For the same reason, the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause guar-
antee of “just compensation” also seems an unlikely source for policy 
under the PPE. It clearly focuses uniquely on the responsibility of 
government to reimburse private parties for “takings” by that gov-
ernment. Disputes under the Clause typically arise in cases involving 
eminent domain, a doctrine uniquely applicable to the right of the 
government to take private property for public uses.161 Moreover, 
where it is a private employer who has engaged in some form of anal-
ogous “taking,” a common law PPE claim is entirely superfluous. A 
more mundane common law claim in contract, property, or tort (e.g., 
conversion, tortious damage to property) will be a far more straight-
forward path to just compensation.  
                                                                                                                  
 158. See EEOC v. Townley Eng’g & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610, 620-21 (9th Cir. 1988) (rec-
ognizing the ability of employers to express themselves in the workplace but distinguishing 
this ability from coercing employees to conform with conflicting religious convictions); 
Thomas C. Berg, Religious Speech in the Workplace: Harassment or Protected Speech?, 22 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 959, 1002 (1999) (“[W]hen an employer encourages a worker to 
attend church, the worker is likely to feel more pressure to do so than if a co-worker urged 
it. These activities, then, are quite likely to be prima facie covered by Title VII or analogous 
state anti-harassment statutes.”).  
 159. Mergens, 496 U.S. at 250 (“[T]here is a crucial difference between government speech 
endorsing religion, which the Establishment Clause forbids, and private speech endorsing 
religion, which the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses protect.”).  
 160. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 37, § 12.1.1 (stating that the Free Exercise Clause 
“clearly safeguards individual liberty” while the Establishment Clause “seems directed at 
the government”). 
 161. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) (describing the aim of the Tak-
ings Clause as preventing the government "from forcing some people alone to bear public 
burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole”). 
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 If, for example, an employer required employees to contribute 
their own money, property, or uncompensated services toward the 
employer’s enterprise, or toward the employer’s own pockets, without 
compensation, one could plausibly consider this a deduction from the 
employee’s pay, one for which there is either no liability or liability in 
contract, property, or tort. An employee fired for protesting such 
harsh contractual terms would have either no PPE remedy or else a 
remedy analyzable under Free Speech principles.162 As an example of 
the latter, consider an employee terminated for reporting or protest-
ing “wage theft;”163 if she has a PPE claim at all, it would seem to lie 
better within a whistleblower theory than under some sort of analogy 
to a “taking.” 
 At least one court has explicitly distinguished constitutional pro-
visions which by their very nature apply only to government action. 
For example, in Booth v. McDonnell Douglas Truck Services, Inc., the 
Pennsylvania Superior Court rejected a wrongful discharge claim 
based on a provision of the state constitution prohibiting any “laws 
which impair the obligations of contracts.”164 The court specifically 
emphasized that by its plain terms, the constitutional provision bars 
only the passage of a “law” impairing contract rights; thus, since the 
case involved no allegation of state action, the constitutional provi-
sion did not apply.165 
 3.   Due Process/Criminal Procedure Safeguards 
 Procedural safeguards guaranteed by the Bill of Rights might con-
ceivably form the basis of a PPE claim, most likely because the em-
ployer failed to provide an analogous version of them in any investi-
gation of employee misconduct. But it is unreasonable to expect that 
every private employer provide every employee charged with job-
related misconduct the full panoply of procedural protections guaran-
teed by the Bill of Rights.  
 In some cases, this is obvious. For example, as applied to a private 
employer, the Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury would seem 
to be either inherently inapplicable, overly burdensome, or both. 
Courts hardly could be expected to require firms to assemble “juries” 
of fellow employees to settle disputed claims of employee misconduct. 
                                                                                                                  
 162. See infra Part V.B.1. 
 163. “Wage theft” occurs when an employer unlawfully “deprives a worker of legally 
mandated wages,” either by not paying proper overtime compensation, paying less than 
what the employee deserves, or not paying the employee at all. KIM BOBO, WAGE THEFT IN 
AMERICA 6 (2009); see also Barbosa v. Impco Techs., Inc., 101 Cal. Rptr. 3d 923, 927 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 2009) (qualifying an employer’s duty to pay overtime wages as a “well-established 
fundamental public policy affecting the broad public interest”). 
 164. 585 A.2d 24, 28 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (citing PA. CONST. art. I, § 17). 
 165. Id.  
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Similarly inapplicable and/or unduly burdensome are the rights to a 
speedy trial, a public trial, and a trial with a proper venue and juris-
diction, as well as the rights to counsel and compulsory process in 
one’s defense.166 The right to a grand jury and a jury trial in civil law-
suits are inapt sources of policy for similar reasons and for the addi-
tional reason that they do not apply to state governments.167 In other 
cases, the inapplicability of traditional criminal procedure safeguards 
is less obvious and perhaps less convincing; for example, a Pennsyl-
vania court has rejected a PPE claim based on the right of an ac-
cused’s presumption of innocence.168 
 However, there is no shortage of PPE cases protecting employees 
discharged for completing jury service.169 Most of these cases rely on 
statutory provisions requiring persons to perform jury service and 
protecting those who do from adverse employment action.170 However, 
at least one court has based this PPE claim on the constitutional 
right to a jury trial.171 To the extent courts can draw upon the consti-
tutional basis of the jury trial right to underscore the importance of 
protecting employees’ ability to perform jury service free from retali-
ation, such use of that constitutional provision is certainly appropri-
ate and uncontroversial. But given that jury service is both required 
by statute and protected from retaliation by statute in virtually all 
jurisdictions, the use of this constitutional provision is unnecessary 
as a practical matter.  
 The Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination 
should likely be on this same “ineligible” side of the line, for a some-
what distinct reason. Arguably, it could apply by analogy to private 
employment situations. For example, it could be said to apply when 
an employer investigating workplace misconduct calls an employee in 
                                                                                                                  
 166. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. Protection under double jeopardy doctrine also falls 
into this category. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 167. See supra note 107. 
 168. Cisco v. United Parcel Servs., Inc., 476 A.2d 1340, 1344 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984). 
 169. See, e.g., Wiskotoni v. Mich. Nat’l Bank-W., 716 F.2d 378, 383 (6th Cir. 1983) 
(stating that discharge based on subpoena to testify before a grand jury violates public 
policy); Call v. Scott Brass, Inc., 553 N.E.2d 1225, 1230 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (recognizing 
valid PPE claim where employee was terminated for fulfilling duty to appear for jury duty); 
Shaffer v. Frontrunner, Inc., 566 N.E.2d 193, 196 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990) (establishing valid 
claim for employee fired for jury service); Hodges v. S.C. Toof & Co., 833 S.W.2d 896, 899 
(Tenn. 1992) (reinstating lost wages to employee fired for serving on jury duty). 
 170. See, e.g., Call, 553 N.E.2d at 1230 (reasoning that the public policy was “expressed 
by the statutes enacted by the legislature”); Wright v. Faggan, 773 S.W.2d 352 (Tex.  
App. 1989) (considering the underlying statutory purpose as a basis for making jury service 
a PPE). 
 171. See Nees v. Hocks, 536 P.2d 512, 516 (Or. 1975); see also Reuther v. Fowler & 
Williams, Inc., 386 A.2d 119, 120-21 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978) (relying on statute mak-
ing jury service mandatory, as well as state constitutional provision granting the right of 
trial by jury, in defining the state’s public policy). 
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for questioning. This is especially the case if the employer’s grievance 
procedures or a collective bargaining agreement provide for some sort 
of hearing prior to termination. Furthermore, it would not necessari-
ly be fatally burdensome on an employer to forbid firing (or threaten-
ing to fire) all those who wish to remain silent until they can ade-
quately prepare for such a grievance hearing, or until they can con-
sult with a union official, or lawyer, for example.  
 The Supreme Court has made clear that the reason an accused 
has a right to remain silent is that custodial interrogation is inher-
ently coercive.172 It is the ability of the state to use force to detain a 
suspect, as well as its ability to threaten a suspect with jail time, that 
makes the interrogation process so fraught, and the need for a bright-
line right to keep silent so imperative.173 Certainly, being summoned 
to the boss’s office with one’s job on the line can be an intimidating 
experience. But the boss can neither physically force the employee to 
stay and cooperate with questioning, nor credibly threaten a signifi-
cant curtailment of physical liberty in the future (although the threat 
of termination can certainly create substantial psychological pres-
sure). For this reason, the right to remain silent seems a less than 
compelling candidate for a source of public policy under the PPE.  
 Finally, the Eighth Amendment’s protections against excessive 
fines and “cruel and unusual punishment”174 seem an unlikely PPE 
candidate for a different reason. First, in jurisdictions recognizing the 
PPE only in cases of actual discharge,175 it would not apply to cases 
where an employer imposed fines or other punishments for employee 
misconduct short of termination.176 Where adverse employment ac-
tions short of termination could give rise to a PPE claim, or where 
termination itself is considered the “cruel and unusual punishment,” 
applicability still would seem to be rare. Even as to clear state action, 
                                                                                                                  
 172. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 455, 502 (1966) (explaining that such interroga-
tion “exacts a heavy toll on individual liberty and trades on the weakness of individuals” 
through “psychologically coercive pressures”). 
 173. Id. at 512 (emphasizing the important premise that “pressure on the suspect must 
be eliminated”).   
174 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 175. See supra note 47.  
 176. Of course, were the punishment excessive enough, it might constitute constructive 
discharge. Pa. St. Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 147 (2004) (determining the requirements 
for “constructive discharge” to be satisfied where “working conditions [become] so intolera-
ble that a reasonable person would have felt compelled to resign”); see also LARSON, supra 
note 29, § 15.08 (stating that most courts apply some form of this “reasonable person” test). 
Given that Eighth Amendment claims succeed only in cases of the most extreme, “grossly 
excessive” fines and punishments, it may rarely matter whether a jurisdiction recognizes a 
PPE claim for action short of termination. 
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these clauses apply only in the most extreme cases of grossly exces-
sive fines and punishments.177 
 This area closely tests the requirement that only policies that “go 
to the heart of a citizen’s rights, duties, and responsibilities” can sup-
port a PPE claim.178 The public may have a strong interest in ensur-
ing that private employees are not forced to forfeit their privacy, 
their right to choose to participate in (or refrain from participating 
in) worship, or their freedom of speech about matters of public con-
cern. Does it have a similarly strong interest in policing the presum-
ably rare instance in which an abusive employer, for example, docks 
a month’s pay because an employee forgot to properly log her start 
time on the sign-in sheet?179 Given the strong presumption toward at-
will employment, this seems a less viable candidate for the PPE. 
 While some of the procedural protections from the Bill of Rights 
seem implausible sources of the public policy applicable to the PPE 
cases, it still may be that society has an interest in promoting basic 
notions of fairness in the workplace, such that the procedural due 
process protections created by the Due Process Clause itself may be a 
legitimate source of policy. Where a company is large enough to af-
ford internal grievance procedures, for example, it may be appropri-
ate to require that employees using such procedures should be in-
formed of the basis for the allegation of misconduct, and be given no-
tice and an opportunity to rebut the accusation before being dis-
charged.180 This is certainly a requirement for state action under pro-
cedural due process, applicable not only in criminal matters, but also 
                                                                                                                  
 177. See Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 425 (2001) 
(finding this constitutional constraint to be applicable only where punishments are “grossly 
disproportional to the gravity of the offense”); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272 (1980) 
(acknowledging that “[o]utside the context of capital punishment, successful challenges to 
the proportionality of particular sentences have been exceedingly rare”); see also BMW of N. 
Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 559-61 (1996) (declaring a punitive damages award “exces-
sive” only after concluding that none of the elements associated with reprehensible conduct 
were present, the ratio of punitive damages to actual harm was five hundred to one, and the 
economic sanction was substantially greater than any civil penalty available in the state 
where the harm occurred); TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 444 (1993) 
(admitting that a $10 million punitive damage award alongside a $19 thousand actual dam-
ages award was “certainly large” but refusing to classify it as “grossly excessive”). 
 178. Booth v. McDonnell Douglas Truck Servs., Inc., 585 A.2d 24, 28 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991). 
 179. Many state statutes forbid employers from deducting their employees’ pay unless 
authorized to do so by federal law, state law, or contract. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 23-352, -355 (2013); COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-4-105 (2013); OR. REV. STAT. § 652.610(3) 
(2013). An arbitrary, spontaneous employer decision of punishment “overkill” in such a 
situation might trigger a statutory cause of action for the employee, arguably mooting any 
potential PPE issue. But if such overkill is part of existing managerial policy or practice, 
these statutes would be of no help to the employee, for they do not create any minimum 
“floor” of protection against unreasonable deductions from pay. 
 180. Cf. NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 266-68 (1975) (holding that Na-
tional Labor Relations Act supported administrative rule entitling union employee to have 
union representative present at any meeting which might lead to disciplinary action).  
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when a government employer purports to act against a government 
employee.181 The requirement of notice, at least, is one that private 
employers may need to respect, even where the at-will doctrine oth-
erwise applies.182 Or, if the company perversely punishes an employ-
ee for availing herself of those grievance procedures, it may be seen 
as violating fundamental fairness.183 In like manner, at least one 
court has stated that where the employee bypasses the usual griev-
ance channels, he is less likely to have a claim.184 
 But this seems to be an area calling for great caution. Due process 
cases involving government employer-employee relationships seem 
more closely analogous to the PPE situation than due process cases 
involving individual defendants in criminal or civil cases. And, in 
Due Process doctrine, a government employee has no legally cogniza-
ble due process interest, and thus may not even assert a due process 
claim, if that employee is an at-will employee as opposed to one who 
has a right to continued employment (absent bad behavior) under 
either contract or statute.185 It would be incongruous, at the least, and 
possibly unduly burdensome and economically inefficient, to apply 
stricter standards to private employers via the PPE than are applied 
to public employers under the analogous constitutional doctrine.  
B.   Constitutional Provisions that Should Form the Basis of a PPE 
Claim  
 1.   Free Speech: Political Expression 
 Let us begin with the First Amendment right of free speech. Can 
it support a PPE claim? An illustrative case is Novosel v. Nationwide 
Insurance Company.186 
 Novosel, a district claims manager at an insurance company, was 
fired after he refused to participate in his employer’s political agenda 
                                                                                                                  
 181. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542-43 (1985) (balancing 
employer interests with employee interests in concluding that due process requires that a 
government employee receive notice and an opportunity to respond before being denied a 
constitutionally protected property or liberty interest); CHESTER JAMES ANTIEAU & 
WILLIAM J. RICH, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 35.18 (2d ed. 1997) (discussing proce-
dural due process rights in public employment dismissal proceedings as requiring proper 
notice and an opportunity to respond).  
 182. See Person v. Bell Atl.—Va., Inc., 993 F. Supp. 958, 961 (E.D. Va. 1998) (charac-
terizing Virginia common law at-will employment doctrine as incorporating requirement 
that employer give reasonable notice before termination. in the absence of any agreement 
to the contrary). 
 183. Cf. Wounaris v. W. Va. St. Coll., 588 S.E.2d 406 (W. Va. 2003) (upholding PPE 
claim against state actor when college rehired employee after she won an ALJ proceeding, 
only to immediately re-fire her while an appeal was still pending). 
 184. See Geary v. U.S. Steel Corp., 319 A.2d 174,179-80 (Pa. 1974).  
 185. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 344-47 (1976).  
 186. 721 F.2d 894 (3d. Cir. 1983). 
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and efforts to lobby the Pennsylvania House of Representatives.187 
Defending against a PPE claim, the insurance company argued that 
a wrongful discharge action depended upon the violation only of a 
statutorily recognized policy, and that a constitutional provision 
could not provide the source of a PPE claim.188 The Third Circuit re-
jected this argument and held for the employee. Even though the 
dismissal did not violate a specific statute, it was enough that it con-
travened a “clearly mandated public policy” that arose “directly from 
the Constitution,” i.e., political and associational freedoms.189 Accord-
ingly, the court reasoned that a corporation’s interest in supporting 
its state legislature did not outweigh societal interests in free politi-
cal expression.190 As the Third Circuit explained, “the protection of an 
employee’s freedom of political expression would appear to involve no 
less compelling a societal interest than the fulfillment of jury service 
or the filing of a workers’ compensation claim.”191 
 Novosel represents perhaps the high-water mark for aggressive 
use of constitutional principles for the PPE. The Third Circuit de-
clined to extend Novosel a decade later, holding that intervening 
Pennsylvania cases cast doubt on the availability of constitutional 
sources, and that, at any rate, the narrowness of the PPE counseled 
against extending Novosel to reach the First and Fourth Amend-
ments.192 Instead, the Third Circuit relied on normal tort law (in that 
case, invasion of privacy) rather than the “search and seizure” provi-
sion of the Fourth Amendment.193 
 Of course, a too robust PPE may actually interfere with the free 
speech rights of employers. Arguably, an employer who wishes to fur-
ther ideological aims with his business ought to be able to hire (and 
fire) based on whether an employee shares the employer’s sense of 
mission. An eco-friendly energy company should be able to decide to 
hire only “green” employees and to terminate the employee who de-
nies the existence of human-induced climate change. For that matter, 
ought not a diehard, conservative, Republican small-business owner 
have the right to decide to spend his workdays only with like-minded 
employees who share his values—including his party affiliation? At 
least, in a small business setting, such an employer may have a free 
association interest in choosing the persons with whom he spends 
forty hours a week. It is partly for this reason that antidiscrimination 
                                                                                                                  
 187. Id. at 895-96. 
 188. Id. at 898. 
 189. Id. at 899-901.  
 190. Id. at 899. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Borse v. Piece Goods Shop, Inc., 963 F.2d 611, 619-20 (3d Cir. 1992). 
 193. Id. at 621-22.  
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statutes exempt small businesses with only a very small number of 
employees.194 The Supreme Court has recognized a right of freedom of 
association in membership organizations that is greater for smaller, 
more intimate groups than it is for larger, more widespread groups.195 
Such a freedom of association is not as great when it comes to choos-
ing with whom one works,196 but it should enjoy some respect.197  
 It is precisely the right to hire and fire based on party affiliation 
which the law denies to a public employer, except for high-ranking 
political appointments.198 A government employer cannot fire an  
employee for being of the wrong political party.199 But a private em-
ployer presumably can: there is no direct First Amendment  
protection given the lack of state action, and while some state anti-
discrimination statutes list party affiliation as a protected status for 
private employees,200 Title VII201 and many state anti-discrimination 
statutes do not.202 
                                                                                                                  
 194. Leroy D. Clark, Employment Discrimination Testing: Theories of Standing and a 
Reply to Professor Yelnosky, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1, 15 (1994). It is certainly for this rea-
son that part of the Civil Rights Act’s public accommodations provision, 42 
U.S.C. § 2000a(b)(1) (2012), and part of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b)(2) (2012), 
have the so-called “Mrs. Murphy’s boardinghouse” exemption for dwellings with at most four 
or five units or families. James D. Walsh, Reaching Mrs. Murphy: A Call for Repeal of the 
Mrs. Murphy Exemption to the Fair Housing Act, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 605, 606 (1999). 
 195. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 621-22 (1984) (stating that a large national 
organization with large, otherwise nonselective memberships did not have a First Amend-
ment Free Association right to engage in sex discrimination illegal under state law). 
 196. Id. (“[T]he Constitution undoubtedly imposes [free association] constraints on the 
State’s power to control the selection of one’s spouse that would not apply to regulations af-
fecting the choice of one’s fellow employees.”); see also Guesby v. Kennedy, 580 F. Supp. 1280, 
1284 (D. Kan. 1984) (“[I]n the context of an employment relationship, the scope of the right of 
association is much more limited than in the context of membership in an organization.”). 
 197. See Julie Manning Magid & Jamie Darin Prenkert, The Religious and Associa-
tional Freedoms of Business Owners, 7 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 191 (2005) (arguing that 
employers with an avowed religious or theological mission and orientation, even if not 
themselves a religious organization, should enjoy a free association-based latitude to prefer 
co-religionists as employees). 
 198. See, e.g., Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 517-19 (1980) (stating that with the ex-
ception of certain instances where political affiliation would “interfere with the discharge of 
his public duties . . . the continued employment of an assistant public defender cannot 
properly be conditioned upon his allegiance to the political party”).   
 199. See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976) (plurality opinion) (stating that ter-
mination of public employees based on party affiliation unconstitutional under the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments). 
 200. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1101 (West 2012) (prohibiting private employers from controlling 
or directing the political affiliations of employees); D.C. CODE § 2-1401.01 (2013) (prohibiting 
private employers from making employment decisions based on political affiliation). 
 201. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012). 
 202. See, e.g., 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/1-102 (2012) (not including political affiliation 
among categories protected from employment discrimination); IOWA CODE § 216.6 (2013) 
(same); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-21-401 (2012) (same); MISS. CODE ANN. § 33-1-15 (2013) (same). 
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 So it seems sensible to say that not every free speech-centered lim-
it constitutionally imposed on a government employer action ought to 
apply to private employers. But that should not mean that there are 
no proper free speech-type rights enjoyed by employees. Some should 
exist, subject to limitations, based on the considerations below.  
 (a)   Forced Speech 
 The Novosel case illustrates a prime candidate for such protection, 
namely when employers force employees to engage in unwelcome 
speech. The problem is real, and in recent years, reports of employers 
who have pressured employees into making political campaign con-
tributions or even attending political rallies have risen.203 These em-
ployers make attendance at political rallies mandatory, and strongly 
encourage monetary contributions.204 They keep track of who cooper-
ates and who does not, with the latter group subject to sanctions like 
demotions and the withholding of bonuses.205 
 Given the rising influence of large corporations on the political 
scene,206 this potential to arm-twist armies of surrogate speakers 
bodes ill for the political process. This danger to the political process 
justifies the application of the PPE to protect free speech values, at 
least where the employer is using the employer-employee relation-
ship to unduly influence employees. So, while a private employer may 
be able to burden employee free speech values more than the gov-
ernment, this ability is still somewhat constrained: at a minimum, 
they should not be able to force their employees to engage in expres-
sive political activity.  
 Existing FEC regulations prohibit such coercion if designed to re-
sult in a financial contribution in a federal election.207 However, such 
protections at the state level for state and local elections are far more 
rare. Even at the federal level, the regulations apply only to coerced 
                                                                                                                  
 203. See, e.g., Robert Kelner, Allegations of Employer Coercion of Political Activity Are on 
the Rise, INSIDE POLITICAL LAW (Oct. 17, 2012), http://www.insidepoliticallaw.com/2012/ 
10/17/allegations-of-employer-coercion-of-political-activity-are-on-the-rise/; Alec MacGillis, Coal 
Miner’s Donor, THE NEW REPUBLIC (Oct. 4, 2012), http://www.newsrepublic.com/ 
article/politics/108140/coal-miners-donor-mitt-romney-benefactor (describing pressure tactics 
used by Murray Energy to get employees to attend political rallies and to make contributions).  
 204. MacGillis, supra note 203. 
 205. Id. 
 206. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 343 (2010) (recogniz-
ing the free speech rights of corporations through political spending and holding invalid 
campaign finance reform rules which treat corporate entities different from natural per-
sons); see also Developments in the Law: Corporations and Society, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2272 
(2004) (discussing the prominence of corporations in the political sphere that has led to an 
increase in their social accountability). 
 207. 11 C.F.R. § 114.2(f)(2)(E)(iv) (2013).  
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contributions, and not forced attendance at rallies, pressure to sign 
petitions, or the like.  
 Most state provisions ban discrimination based only on a refusal 
to contribute rather than upon the act of making a financial contribu-
tion.208 States more commonly protect the right to vote,209 sometimes 
classified as “the right of suffrage.”210 However, some courts construe 
this protection to extend to other forms of political activity besides 
actually casting a vote.211 This construction supports the tendency 
among jurisdictions to provide protection to employees seeking to ex-
press political beliefs in a way that does not substantially interfere 
with their employer’s interests.  
 (b)   Whistleblowing 
 Another prime candidate for protection is “whistleblowing.” Cer-
tainly, there are no shortage of whistleblower cases, where employees 
reporting misconduct obtain relief either through statutes212 or the 
PPE itself.213 The case for a clear and substantial public policy here is 
compelling. First, there is the impressive number of statutes at the 
                                                                                                                  
 208. ALA. CODE §§ 10A-21-1.01(b), 17-5-17 (2012); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 67-6605 (2012); 
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18:1461.1(A)(2), :1483, :1505.2 (2011); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 56, § 33 
(2012); MO. REV. STAT. §§ 130.028.1(2)-(3) (1997); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 664:4-a(II) 
(2012); S.C. CODE ANN. § 8-13-1332(2) (2011); TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 253.102 (West 
2011); WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17A.495(2)(a) (2011); WIS. STAT. § 12.07(4) (2011); WYO. 
STAT. ANN. § 22-26-111(a)(ii) (2011).  
 209. HAW. REV. STAT. § 19-3 (2011); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-2305 (2012); KY. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 121.310(1) (West 2011); 25 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3547 (2012); TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-19-
134(b) (2012); W. VA. CODE § 3-8-11 (2012); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 22-26-111 (2011). 
 210. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 712 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “suffrage” as “[t]he 
right or privilege of casting a vote at a public election”).  
 211. See, e.g., Am. Indep. Party in Idaho, Inc. v. Cenarrusa, 442 P.2d 766, 768 (Idaho 
1968) (recognizing the right of citizens to gather and express political beliefs as inherent to 
the term “suffrage”); Md. Green Party v. Md. Bd. of Elections, 832 A.2d 214, 228 (Md. 2003) 
(indicating that the term “suffrage” includes the right to sign a referendum petition).  
 212. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 39.90.100 (2013); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-1501(3)(c)(ii) 
(2013); N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-01-20(1)(a) (2012); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-50-3(4) (2012). 
 213. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:19-4 (West 2013) (allowing plaintiff to choose be-
tween suing under statute or under common law public policy claim); Porter v. Reardon 
Mach. Co., 962 S.W.2d 932, 938 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) (recognizing whistleblower exception 
to doctrine of employment at will). 
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federal214 and state215 levels providing whistleblower protection of one 
manner or another. Recognizing this as a clear and substantial public 
policy is almost tautological, inasmuch as the activity is often recog-
nized as whistleblowing only when the misconduct alleged is a mat-
ter of significant public concern or implicates significant matters of 
public policy.216 
 While whistleblowing activities are often mentioned as the kind of 
socially desirable activity that might trigger the PPE, in practice, 
whistleblowing has not always sufficed. Courts often distinguish be-
tween whistleblowing to vindicate a public interest versus exposing 
mere private wrongdoing. For example, the Supreme Court of Okla-
homa expressly distinguished between the employee reporting of 
“crimes,” “violation of health or safety laws,” or other actions breach-
ing a public trust, that would be protected under the PPE, and the 
employee reporting of conduct harming “private or proprietary inter-
ests,” that would not.217 Thus, exposing an employer’s Medicare fraud 
was protected, but exposing a co-employee’s embezzlement from a 
private employer was not.218 Examples of cases applying the PPE for 
“whistleblowing” activities aimed at actual violations of law 
                                                                                                                  
 214. See, e.g., Asbestos Emergency Response Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2651 (2012) (protects 
employees from discrimination or retaliation for reporting alleged violations of environ-
mental laws relating to asbestos in elementary and secondary school systems); Sarbanes-
Oxley Act, 18 U.S.C § 1514(A) (2012) (protects employees of publicly traded companies, and 
their contractors, subcontractors, and agents from discrimination or discharge for reporting 
violations of the federal mail, wire, bank, or securities fraud statutes, or any other provi-
sion of federal law relating to fraud against shareholders); Occupational Safety and Health 
Act, 29 U.S.C § 660(c) (2012) (protects employees from discrimination or retaliation for 
reporting workplace or safety hazards); 33 U.S.C. § 1367 (2006); Energy Reorganization 
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5851 (2006) (protects employees in the nuclear power and nuclear medi-
cine industries against discrimination or discharge for reporting violations of nuclear safe-
ty laws); 42 U.S.C § 6971 (2006) (each protecting employees from discrimination or dis-
charge for reporting violations of certain environmental laws or regulations); 42 
U.S.C § 7622 (2006); International Safe Container Act, 46 U.S.C. App. § 1506 (2006) (pro-
tects employees who are discharged or discriminated against for filing an OSHA complaint 
alleging unsafe containers for internal cargo); Surface Transportation Assistance Act, 49 
U.S.C. § 31105 (2006) (protects employees of the trucking industry who are discharged, 
disciplined, or discriminated against for reporting commercial motor vehicle safety haz-
ards, health, or safety concerns). 
 215. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 448.102(1) (2013) (prohibiting “retaliatory personnel action” 
where an employee reports employer’s unlawful conduct or refuses to engage in illegal ac-
tivity); NEV. REV. STAT. § 281.631 (2013) (prohibiting the use of “authority or influence to 
prevent disclosure of improper governmental action by another state or local governmental 
officer or employee”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1-304 (2013) (providing that “[n]o employee 
shall be discharged or terminated solely for refusing to participate in, or for refusing to 
remain silent about, illegal activities”); W. VA. CODE § 6C-1-1 (2013) (providing protection 
to a discharged employee “where the employer's motivation for the discharge is to contra-
vene some substantial public policy principle”).  
 216. See supra notes 142-145. 
 217. Darrow v. Integris Health, Inc., 176 P.2d 1204, 1213-15 (Okla. 2008). 
 218. Id. (citing Hayes v. Eateries, Inc., 905 P.2d 778, 785 (Okla. 1995)). 
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abound.219 But, the employee is less likely to be protected when the 
speech concerns employment grievances or generic concerns about 
quality control not involving illegality.220 
 The extent to which courts recognize a whistleblowing-based PPE 
suit may involve whether the employee had a legal duty to report the 
alleged impropriety; whether the employee followed proper internal 
reporting procedures or violated the chain of command; and whether 
the employee had the requisite expertise in the area in question to 
recognize a legitimate need for whistleblowing.221 At least one court 
has held that an employee enjoys no right to champion “product safety” 
where the employee is not qualified to render an expert opinion on 
product safety, or where safety assessment was not part of his duties.222 
 The somewhat tepid protection given to whistleblowing activities 
is actually consistent with constitutional rules. In free speech cases 
involving public employees who criticize their organizations, the Su-
preme Court has provided First Amendment protection only when (1) 
the speech relates to a matter of “public concern;” (2) it is not spoken 
by the employee as part of the employee’s job duties; and (3) its value 
outweighs any potential damage to the government office’s reputa-
tion, efficiency, or the like.223 This is because public employers have a 
legitimate interest in controlling speech that can directly affect the 
performance of their agency or office.224 If the speech satisfies condi-
tions (1) and (2) above, and the court determines that the legitimate 
interests of the government employer in efficient operations do not 
                                                                                                                  
 219. See, e.g., Sheets v. Teddy’s Frosted Foods, Inc., 427 A.2d 385 (Conn. 1980) (state 
labeling and licensing laws); Palmer v. Brown, 752 P.2d 685, 689-90 (Kan. 1988) (Medicaid 
fraud); Harless v. First Nat’l Bank in Fairmont, 246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1978) (state and 
federal consumer credit protection laws). 
 220. Compare Flesner v. Technical Comm’n Corp., 575 N.E.2d 1107, 1111 (Mass. 1991) 
(applying exception to termination for cooperating with a federal investigation of the em-
ployer), with Wright v. Shriners Hosp. for Crippled Children, 589 N.E.2d 1241, 1245 (Mass. 
1992) (declining to apply PPE to termination for criticizing employer to national medical 
accrediting body), and Hrehorovich v. Harbor Hosp. Ctr., Inc., 614 A.2d 1021, 1033 (Md. 
App. 1992) (declining to apply PPE where hospital employee, claiming right to “promote 
quality health care,” engaged in extensive criticisms of the hospital). See also Suchodolski 
v. Mich. Consol. Gas Co., 316 N.W.2d 710 (Mich. 1982) (corporate management dispute 
regarding internal accounting procedures did not amount to violation of a clearly mandated 
public policy). 
 221. Field v. Phila. Elec. Co., 565 A.2d 1170, 1180-81 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) 
 222. Geary v. U.S. Steel Corp., 391 A.2d 174, 180 (Pa. 1974). 
 223. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 423 (2006); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 
(1983) (“When employee expression cannot be fairly considered as relating to any matter of 
political, social, or other concern to the community, government officials should enjoy wide 
latitude in managing their offices, without intrusive oversight by the judiciary in the name 
of the First Amendment.”).  
 224. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421-23.  
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outweigh the employee’s free speech interests, then the employer 
may not engage in any adverse employment action.225 
 Something analogous ought to apply in the private employment 
sphere under the PPE. Speech on matters not of a public concern 
ought not to trigger PPE protection. And, if a job’s duties require an 
employee to make presentations, write memos, etc., the employer 
must fire the employee based on the content of what she says. The 
tougher question arises when the speech concerns a matter of public 
interest and is not made pursuant to job duties. 
(c)   Coverage Inspired by Statutory Speech Protection for Private 
Employees  
 While the above principles apply equally to state government  
employees,226 neither federal nor state constitutional principles  
directly provide free speech protection to private employees.227 Fur-
ther, most states lack any explicit statutory free speech protection for 
private employees.  
 However, a minority of states have promoted similar free speech 
principles in varying degrees within the realm of private employ-
ment.228 Over a half-dozen states generally prohibit employers from 
punishing employees for engaging in political activities.229 A few pro-
hibit discrimination based narrowly on election-related speech,230 and 
a few others extend employment protection to the expression of “po-
litical” ideas, opinions, or beliefs.231  
 Another area of variation is whether anti-discriminatory provi-
sions apply only to expressions occurring outside of the employer’s 
                                                                                                                  
 225. Id. 
 226. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 630 (1925) (Fourteenth Amendment Due 
Process Clause incorporates First Amendment right to free speech); Smith v. Novato Uni-
fied Sch. Dist., 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d 508 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007). 
 227. See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 513 (1976) (stating that the Constitution 
does not directly provide free speech protection to private corporations or persons); Jacobs 
v. Major, 407 N.W.2d 832, 836 (Wis. 1987) (stating that the free speech clause of the state 
constitution provides protection only against state action). 
 228. See Eugene Volokh, Private Employees’ Speech and Political Activity: Statutory 
Protection Against Employer Retaliation, 16 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 295 (2012) (discussing the 
ways in which state statutes provide protection for employee political speech and activity). 
 229. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 1101 (West 2012); COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-2-108 (2013); LA. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 23.961 (2011); MO. ANN. STAT. § 115.637(6) (West 2012); NEB. REV. 
STAT. § 32-1537 (2012); NEV. REV. STAT. § 613.040 (2012); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17-560 
(2011); W. VA. CODE § 3-8-11(b) (2012). See also SEATTLE, WASH. MUN. CODE § 14.04.040 
(2011) (creating similar general free speech rights for private employees at the municipal 
level); MADISON, WIS. MUN. CODE §§ 39.03(1), .03(2)(cc), .03(8)(c), .03(8)(d)(1) (2010) 
(same).  
 230. See 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/29-4 (2012); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 201-d (McKinney 
2012); WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17A.495(2) (2012). 
 231. See MINN. STAT. § 10A.36 (2012); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-20-13 (West 2012).  
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premises, or additionally, to expressions taking place at the work 
site.232 Even where the statute expressly provides protection to off-
premises speech, there is variation as to degree. For example, in 
mandating employers to terminate employees only for “[g]ood cause,” 
Montana clarifies that the scope of protection applies, but is not lim-
ited to, “[t]he legal use of a lawful product by an individual off the 
employer’s premises during nonworking hours.”233 While such stat-
utes are often applied to smoking and drinking after hours and off-
site,234 they also can be applied to more inherently expressive prod-
ucts like political signs and social media programming.235 Colorado 
and North Dakota broaden the reach of this protection by forbidding 
employers to terminate employees for engaging in “any lawful activi-
ty” that occurs off the employer’s premises.236 Finally, state statutes 
also vary the breadth of protection afforded by the use of the term 
“political,”237 and whether protection extends to hiring practices, or to 
only disciplinary actions against current employees.238 
 The variations above alert one to several salient issues regarding 
the proper breadth of free speech protections in the private sphere. 
Courts using free speech principles to inform their PPE analysis 
would do well to consider such issues as, for example, the extent to 
which the expression is political, off-site, or after-hours.  
                                                                                                                  
 232. Compare Cotto v. United Techs. Corp., 711 A.2d 1180 (Conn. App. Ct. 1998)  
(finding statutory language that does not explicitly limit protection to off-the-job speech 
extends to on-the-premises speech through implication), with Dixon v. Coburg Dairy, Inc., 
330 F.3d 250, 262 (4th Cir. 2004) (interpreting a similar state statute to apply only to off-
premises speech, for fear of making the workplace a “constitutionally protected forum for 
political discourse”).  
 233. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-903 (2011). 
 234. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 181.938 (2012) (employers may not discipline or discharge 
employee based on use of lawful products off-premises during nonworking hours).  
 235. See, e.g., Angel v. Rayl, No. 04CV3420, 2005 WL 6208024, at *2 (D. Colo. Dec. 1, 
2005) (interpreting lawful activity off the job premises to include “attend[ing] certain polit-
ical or social-activism events”); Joseph Lipps, State Lifestyle Statutes and the Blogosphere: 
Autonomy for Private Employees in the Internet Age, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 645, 652-54 (advocat-
ing for a distancing between blogs and social networking activities and adverse employ-
ment action). But see Kolb v. Camilleri, No. 02-CV-0117A(Sr), 2008 WL 3049855, at *13 
(W.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2008) (concluding that picketing did not constitute a “recreational activ-
it[y]” for purposes of a statute protecting such activity when conducted off the job premises). 
 236. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-402.5(1) (2013); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-02.4-03, 4-
08 (West 2011).  
 237. Compare Thompson v. Borg-Warner Protective Servs. Corp., No. C-94-4015 MHP, 
1996 WL 162990, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 1996) (finding the term “political activities” to 
include opinions on alcohol and drug policies within the meaning of sections 1101 and 1102 of 
the California Labor Code), with Vanderhoff v. John Deere Consumer Prods., Inc., No. C.A. 
3:02–0685–22, 2003 WL 23691107, at *2 (D.S.C. March 13, 2003) (holding that a confederate 
flag decal was not a “political opinion” as intended by S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17-560). 
 238. Compare Bools v. Gen. Elec. Co., 70 F. Supp. 2d 829, 832 (S.D. Ohio 1999) (limit-
ing statute’s protection to persons already employed), with Gay Law Students Ass’n v. Pac. 
Tel. & Tel. Co., 595 P.2d 592, 610 n.16 (Cal. 1979) (interpreting a statute that protects 
“employees” to include job applicants).  
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 As noted above,239 in jurisdictions protecting private employees’ 
speech, the existence of such statutory claims need not prevent a 
court from considering a PPE claim. And, the existence of such statu-
tory remedies can help a court decide that a clear public policy to that 
effect exists, such that a PPE claim should be recognized. But, even 
where such statutory remedies do not exist, the constitutional basis 
alone for free speech protections ought to be sufficient to convince 
courts that a clear public policy favoring free speech rights supports a 
PPE claim.  
(d)   Toward a Balance of Employee and Employer Interests 
 It is axiomatic that the right of free speech is “fundamental” in our 
country, and the Supreme Court has repeatedly so held.240 It is the 
very first right listed in the Bill of Rights.241 It was the first substan-
tive (i.e., non-procedural) right to be recognized as “fundamental,” 
and thus, “incorporated” through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause and applied to the states.242 There is no individual 
right more celebrated in the United States. A leading scholar has 
termed it “the Constitution’s most majestic guarantee,” one which 
helps to preserve all other rights.243 If constitutional principles can 
ever inform a courts’ application of the PPE, then such constitutional 
inspiration must include free speech rights.244 
 Certainly, the kind of free speech protection offered to convention-
al government whistleblowers also should apply to private employees 
who blow the whistle on illegal acts. But should the PPE extend be-
yond such a straightforward type of employer harassment, to adverse 
employment action taken against an employee for engaging in other 
types of speech? If one is committed to a vibrant, free speech-oriented 
society, the answer should be yes.  
                                                                                                                  
 239. See supra Part III.A. 
 240. See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3061 (2010); Near v. Min-
nesota, 283 U.S. 697, 707 (1931); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). 
 241. U.S. CONST. amend. I.  
 242. See Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 666. 
 243. Nelson v. McClatchy Newspapers, Inc., 936 P.2d 1123, 1129 (Wash. 1997) (quoting 
LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-1 (2d ed. 1988)). 
 244. Cf. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244-45 (1959) (Na-
tional Labor Relations Act’s protection of union employees’ picketing rights preempted 
contrary state law principles). The existence of strong NLRA preemption of state law  
might suggest that much of the Free Speech-based PPE discussion in this Section was un-
necessary: perhaps federal labor law statutes preempted the analysis entirely. But, analo-
gizing from Supreme Court First Amendment case law, this Article suggests that the PPE 
should not apply to job-related speech. This approach would thus apply the PPE only in 
situations in which federal labor law did not apply, and could thus raise no legitimate issue 
of federal preemption.  
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 First, the case for protecting employees from “forced speech” is 
quite compelling. Even in relatively trouble-free economic times, em-
ployees are simply not that portable. Being fired from one’s job and 
being forced to find new employment is a traumatic experience for 
many, especially those who live paycheck to paycheck. Employers, 
thus, have a potent coercive influence over their employees.245 Allow-
ing them to abuse that power to influence the political process would 
skew our political debate and undermine our democratic process.   
 Even beyond forced speech situations, there is a strong public pol-
icy interest in granting private employees a certain amount of free 
speech latitude. We protect free speech not merely as a means of 
promoting discussion and participation in democratic government, 
and not merely to further the discovery of truth through “the mar-
ketplace of ideas,” but also because individual self-expression is good 
for its own sake.246 It leads to happier, more fulfilled lives: a better 
quality of life for the individuals doing the expressing, and because 
these individuals are more fulfilled, a more pleasant environment for 
the friends and coworkers around them.  
 The vast majority of Americans are employees who spend about 
one-third of their lives, and almost half their waking lives, at their 
place of work. It is a prime place for them to communicate with  
their peers, and for them to receive information from their peers.  
For workers to be denied a certain range of motion in their expres-
sion could seriously dampen this individual self-fulfillment, not to 
mention sabotage the search for truth and diminish the vitality of 
our democracy.  
 Again, it is no answer to suggest that anyone who does not like the 
free speech restrictions of their employer can find other employment. 
For most of these people, the prospect of losing their jobs is a signifi-
cant hardship, and has a formidable chilling effect on their speech.  
 Current law recognizes certain limitations on the PPE doctrine to 
recognize the legitimate interests of employers. Again, Novosel  
                                                                                                                  
 245. A similar analysis informs federal labor law. In NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 
U.S. 575 (1969), the Supreme Court explained that the “economic dependence” of employ-
ees required that employers be very careful in expressing anti-union sentiments prior to 
union elections, lest employees be unduly influenced by coercive “intended implications” of 
such efforts. Id. at 617. And in NLRB v. Exch. Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405 (1964), the Court 
held that the NLRA kept employers from granting benefits on the eve of a union election, 
even if they were unconditional and permanent. The potential coercive influence of such 
employer action was so great, the Court reasoned, that even the implicit threat of such a 
move—i.e., the suggestion that future benefits could dry up if employees did not vote the 
way the employer wanted—could constitute a “fist inside the velvet glove” and thus violate 
the NLRA. Id. at 409-10.  
 246. See Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 147 (1967) (free speech protection ad-
vances “truth, science, morality, and arts in general as well as responsible government” (quo-
tation marks omitted)); 25 JOHN STUART MILL, ESSAY ON LIBERTY 246-49 (Charles W. Eliot 
ed., 1909) (1859) (famously expounding the “utilitarian” rationale for free speech protections).  
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provides a good example. Even as it drew upon constitutional princi-
ples to extend free speech protection to private employers via the 
PPE, the court stated guidelines to protect the employers’ preroga-
tives.247 It called for other courts considering such claims to weigh, 
inter alia, the employer’s contractual interests; whether the time, 
place, and manner of the speech interferes with business operations, 
or with “essential and close working relationships;” and whether it 
prevents the employer or employee from efficiently carrying out the 
requisite responsibilities.248 
 Although such employer interests do not typically qualify for the 
bona fide occupational qualification exception, state legislatures have 
included provisions within their statutes to constrain broad employee 
protection in order to protect employer interests.249 As an illustration, 
courts have held that a newspaper could prevent its reporters from 
engaging in political activity when such activity frustrates the em-
ployer’s purpose by creating an apparent conflict of interest,250 or 
from engaging in speech when that speech was placing an advertise-
ment in a rival newspaper.251 Similarly, a New York court found a 
discharge lawful where an employee’s affiliation with Holocaust de-
niers threatened to harm the reputation of the employer.252 
 Even where the speech involved does not present a conflict of in-
terest or bring the company into public disrepute generally, it may be 
unprotected if it is a publicly expressed opinion at odds with that of 
the employer’s and potentially injurious to the employer’s financial 
interests. For example, a Massachusetts court found it legitimate for 
a defense contractor to fire its spokesperson for publicly advocating a 
decline in defense spending, a topic of “acute concern” to the company 
in which it had a direct “financial stake.”253 In general, then, courts 
                                                                                                                  
 247. Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 894, 901 (3d Cir. 1983). 
 248. Id. 
 249. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-903(5) (2013) (establishing “good cause” for dismissal 
where employees cause “disruption of the employer's operation, or other legitimate business 
reason”); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-03 (2011) (limiting employee protection to activities that 
are “not in direct conflict with the essential business-related interests of the employer”). 
 250. See Nelson v. McClatchy Newspapers, Inc., 936 P.2d 1123, 1127 (Wash. 1997) 
(determining that a state law prohibiting employment discrimination based on an employ-
ee's political conduct was not constitutionally applicable to newspaper publishers). 
 251. See Martin v. Capital Cities Media, Inc., 511 A.2d 830, 844 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986). 
 252. See Berg v. German Nat’l Tourist Office, 248 A.D.2d 297, 298 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1998) (affirming the lower court’s dismissal of the wrongful discharge suit, without refer-
encing the initial grounds for the discharge); Salvatore Arena, Tourist Office KOs Damage 
Suit, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Feb. 12, 1997, 12:00 AM), http://www.nydailynews.com 
/archives/news/tourist-office-kos-damage-suit-article-1.760157 (explaining that the employ-
ee was fired for Holocaust denial associations, and that the lower court upheld the termi-
nation because Holocaust denial conflicts with the business interests of the German Na-
tional Tourist Office).  
 253. Korb v. Raytheon Corp., 410 N.E.2d 581, 584-85 (Mass. 1991).  
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may reject free speech-based PPE claims where the employee speaks 
“against the interests” of the employer.254 There is no protection  
for speech which actively disrupts the employer or provides assis-
tance to competitors.  
 A middle-ground approach is needed, one which balances the pub-
lic interest in protecting employees’ rights of expression with those of 
the employer. Existing PPE case law already points the way. For ex-
ample, protected whistleblowing activity is more likely to be protect-
ed when it involves actual illegality, as opposed to mere criticism of a 
firm’s products or procedures. Employees should not have the right to 
trash their employers publicly or to engage in conduct that diminish-
es their reputation, but they certainly should have the right to point 
out illegal employer conduct. At the same time, even where the Su-
preme Court recognizes a legitimate business prerogative on the part 
of an employer, it has shown its willingness to withdraw such defer-
ence when the facts show that the employer is using its business ra-
tionale as a pretext for more ordinary unfair labor practices.255 
 Drawing upon existing statutory and case law protections for 
guidance, we recommend some basic guidelines for PPE claims based 
on free speech principles. First, an employer should not be able to 
discharge an employee for expression protected by the First Amend-
ment taking place while the employee is off-duty and off-premises, 
unless such activity is against the employer’s interest. Expression 
can run counter to the employer’s interest if it (1) aids a competitor; 
(2) exposes confidential information; (3) runs counter to the avowed 
mission of the firm or organization; (4) harms the reputation of the 
employer; or (5) materially and substantially disrupts productivity 
(e.g., by harming morale). The latter two exceptions would not apply 
if the employee speech was not merely criticism but actual whistle-
blowing, i.e., accurate factual assertions exposing illegal or unethical 
practices, or practices threatening the public health or welfare. Fur-
ther, the above exceptions would not apply where the facts showed 
that the employer’s proffered business justification was pre-textual. 
                                                                                                                  
 254. Id. at 284. See also Rossi v. Pa. St. Univ., 489 A.2d 828 (Pa. 1985) (employee who 
lost PPE claim had continuously complained to supervisors about financial waste in his 
department, thus becoming “troublesome”). See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-402.5(1)(b) 
(2012) (prohibiting employers from firing employees based on their lawful conduct off the 
employment premises unless such conduct conflicts with their responsibilities to the em-
ployer); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 201-d(3)(a) (2011) (making it unlawful for an employer to discrim-
inate based on employees’ off-duty political activities unless such activities interfere with 
the employer’s interest). 
 255. See Assoc’d Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 131 (1937) (NLRA restrictions on firing 
for attempting to organize a workforce did not violate media employer’s free press rights 
where the employer acted not out of editorial prerogative but out of a desire to suppress 
union membership).  
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 Tying the PPE to expression protected by the First Amendment 
means an employer can fire an employee for off-premises, off-duty 
speech that, e.g., is obscene or defamatory, or constitutes “fighting 
words.” Speech that is highly offensive but constitutionally protected—
e.g., racist or anti-Semitic slurs, or sexually “indecent” but non-obscene 
speech—could be grounds for termination to the extent it was open, 
public, and notorious, and could plausibly be connected back to the 
employer by the public, thus harming the employer’s reputation. 
 For speech made on-duty, on-premises, or using the employer’s 
facilities, resources, or materials, the employer should have wide lati-
tude to discipline or terminate an employee. Courts should intervene 
only where the employer is using its power to pressure employees to 
make political contributions, vote a certain way, or express a certain 
political opinion. 
2.   Fourth Amendment Privacy 
 The personal privacy rights256 guaranteed by the Fourth Amend-
ment’s protection against unreasonable searches and seizures are 
also excellent candidates for constitutional rights driving a PPE 
analysis. These rights are well known to citizens at large, as the re-
cent controversy over domestic surveillance by the National Security 
Agency demonstrates.257 The Fourth Amendment’s privacy protec-
tions apply to the states through incorporation, of course.258 Moreo-
ver, all state constitutions have some comparable provision.259 And, 
                                                                                                                  
 256. The privacy concerns protected by the Fourth Amendment are analytically distinct 
from the “right to privacy” held to apply under the Due Process Clause as part of substantive 
due process. The latter protects individuals from unwarranted state interference in deeply 
personal matters such as childrearing, family, reproduction, and intimate relations. See infra 
Part V.C.1-2. The Fourth Amendment search and seizure brand of privacy is sometimes re-
ferred to as “informational privacy.” See Planned Parenthood of S. Ariz. v. Lawall, 307 F.3d 
783, 789 (9th Cir. 2002) (defining “informational privacy” as encompassing “privacy interest 
in avoiding disclosure of sensitive personal information”); Francis S. Chlapowski, Note, The 
Constitutional Protection of Informational Privacy, 71 B.U. L. REV. 133, 135 (1991) (asserting 
that an individual’s “interest in informational privacy is a right that the Constitution protects 
under the due process clauses' protection of both liberty and property”).  
 257. See David Aronofksy & Matthew Cooper, The War on Terror and International 
Human Rights: Does Europe Get it Right?, 37 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 567, 576 (2009) 
(describing the NSA’s surveillance program as having deleterious effect on privacy rights 
by “reaching into the homes and offices of Americans all throughout the United States 
and elsewhere”); Joshua Kopstein, Senators Strike at Surveillance Laws Authorizing 
NSA’s Warrantless Data Collection, THE VERGE (June 24, 2013, 6:25 PM), 
http://www.theverge.com/2013/6/24/4460334/senators-strike-at-nsa-surveillance-laws. 
 258. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). 
 259. ALA. CONST. art. I § 5; ALASKA CONST. art. I § 14; ARIZ. CONST. art. II § 8; ARK. 
CONST. art. II § 15; CAL. CONST. art. I § 13; COLO. CONST. art. II § 7; CONN. CONST. art. 
I § 7; DEL. CONST. art. I § 6; FLA. CONST. art. I § 12; GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, § XIII; HAW. 
CONST. art. I § 7; IDAHO CONST. art. I § 17; Ill. CONST. art. I § 6; IND. CONST. art. I § 11; 
IOWA CONST. art. I § 8; KAN. CONST. BILL OF RIGHTS § 15; KY. CONST. § 10; LA. CONST. art. 
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all states are subject to certain federal statutes protecting privacy 
interests of even private employees. For example, Congress has re-
stricted the use of polygraph tests for pre-employment screening,260 
inquiries about employee disabilities,261 and the use of genetic infor-
mation in employment decisionmaking.262 
 At least one state constitution includes a right of privacy that ap-
plies to private action.263 Further, as with free speech rights, many 
states have passed statutes guaranteeing private employee privacy, 
at least in specific contexts, such as drug testing.264 This privacy in-
terest is perhaps even stronger than free speech as a PPE candidate, 
given that the common law recognizes a variety of privacy-based 
causes of action.265 
 The strength of this interest is intuitive. We all have certain sen-
sitive information concerning our lives away from the office—off-duty 
matters which have no effect on one’s work productivity. It should 
not be controversial that society has an interest in protecting the 
ability of workers to keep that information private. As the Third Cir-
cuit put it: 
It may be granted that there are areas of an employee’s life in 
which [the] employer has no legitimate interest. An intrusion into 
                                                                                                                  
I § 5; ME. CONST. art. I § 5; MD. CONST., DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. XXVII; MASS. 
CONST. PT. 1, art. XIV; MICH. CONST. art. I § 11; MINN. CONST. art. I § 10; MISS. CONST. art. 
III § 23; MO. CONST. art. I § 15; MONT. CONST. art. II § 11; NEB. CONST. art. 1, § 7; NEV. 
CONST. art. I § 18; N.H. CONST. PT. 1, art. XIX; N.J. CONST. art. I § 7; N.M. CONST. art. 
II § 10; N.Y. CONST. art. I § 12; N.C. CONST. art. I § 20; N.D. CONST. art. I § 8; OHIO CONST. 
art. I § 14; OKLA. CONST. art. II § 30; OR. CONST. art. I § 9; PA. CONST. art. I § 8; R.I. CONST. 
art. I § 6; S.C. CONST. art. I § 10; S.D. CONST. art. VI § 11; TENN. CONST. art. I § 7; TEX. 
CONST. art. I § 9; UTAH CONST. art. I § 14; VT. CONST. CH. 1, art. I § 11; VA. CONST. art. 
I § 10; WASH. CONST. art. I § 7; W. VA. CONST. art. III § 6; WIS. CONST. art. I § 11; WYO. 
CONST. art. I § 4. 
 260. Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2001–2009 (2012). 
 261. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2012). 
 262. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-1 
(Supp. II 2008). 
 263. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. I § 1; Luck v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 267 Cal. Rptr. 618, 
627-28 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (forcing employee to offer urine sample violated her right of 
privacy as articulated in state constitution).  
 264. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 56.20 (West 2013) (providing standards of confidentiali-
ty regarding employee medical records); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 31-51t to -51aa (2012) (regu-
lating an employer’s right to enforce drug testing of current employees in the private sec-
tor); HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-26.5(5) (2013) (making it unlawful for an employer “to [u]tilize 
any device that intrudes into any part or cavity of the body for the purpose of truth verifi-
cation”); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 214, § 1B (2013) (protecting an individual from “unreasona-
ble, substantial or serious interference with his privacy”); see generally Wefing, supra note 
23 (comparing drug testing policies of public employers with that of private employers).  
 265. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A-E (1977) (listing the types of torts 
grounded in the right of privacy). See e.g., GA. CODE. ANN. § 16-11-62(1) (2013) (prohibiting 
by law any form of eavesdropping or surveillance performed in a “clandestine manner”); 
West v. Media Gen. Convergence, Inc., 53 S.W.3d 640 (Tenn. 2001) (recognizing the tort of 
false light invasion of privacy). 
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one of these areas by virtue of the employer’s power of discharge 
might plausibly give rise to a cause of action, particularly where 
some recognized facet of public policy is threatened.266 
 Some courts have recognized a privacy-based PPE cause of action. 
In some cases, courts have merely drawn on statutory sources,267 but 
sometimes they have drawn, at least in part, on constitutional inter-
ests.268 These courts have often engaged in a balancing-of-interests 
approach, weighing the privacy interests of the employee with the 
legitimate business interests of the employer.269 In the context of 
drug testing, for example, courts have been willing to recognize a 
wrongful discharge claim where a mandatory drug-testing policy 
tested for drug use outside the workplace and work hours, was not 
based on individualized suspicion, and did not involve sensitive safe-
ty-related positions.270 These factors are also central to the Supreme 
Court’s Fourth Amendment analysis of government-imposed drug 
testing programs on public employees.271 Similarly, some courts have 
recognized a privacy-related PPE cause of action where plaintiffs 
                                                                                                                  
 266. Borse v. Piece Goods Shop, Inc., 963 F.2d 611, 622 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting Geary v. 
U.S. Steel Corp., 456 A.2d 174, 180 (Pa. 1974)). The Third Circuit actually had rejected use 
of the Fourth Amendment as a source for public policy, but acknowledged that the privacy 
concerns under state tort law and the Constitution were similar. See id. at 621 n.10.  
 267. See, e.g., Doyon v. Home Depot USA, Inc., 850 F. Supp. 125 (D. Conn. 1994)  
(private employer's post-accident drug-testing policy violated statutory provision prohibit-
ing employers from requiring an employee to submit to urinalysis testing without  
reasonable suspicion). 
 268. See, e.g., Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc., 768 P.2d 1123, 1130 (Alaska 
1989); Hennessey v. Coastal Eagle Point Oil Co., 609 A.2d 11, 16-17 (N.J. 1992); Twigg v. 
Hercules Corp., 406 S.E.2d 52, 55 (W. Va. 1990). 
 269. Twigg, 406 S.E.2d at 55-56; but see Jennings v. Minco Tech. Labs, Inc., 765 S.W.2d 
497, 502 (Tex. App. 1989) (rejecting a balancing approach, and holding drug testing within 
an employer’s prerogative). The analysis is different, and more employee-favorable, in Cali-
fornia, where the state constitution’s privacy right actually applies directly to private em-
ployers. See Kraslawsky v. Upper Deck Co., 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 297 (1997) (state constitution-
al guarantee of the right to pursue and obtain privacy creates a right of action against pri-
vate as well as government entities). Some cases have also recognized a PPE cause of ac-
tion against employee drug testing based on non-constitutional statutory sources. See, e.g., 
Doyon, 850 F. Supp. at 125 (private employer's post-accident drug testing policy violated 
statutory provision prohibiting employers from requiring an employee to submit to urinal-
ysis testing without reasonable suspicion). 
 270. Compare Luedtke, 768 P.2d at 1123 (rejecting PPE claim where plaintiffs performed 
safety-sensitive jobs), with Twigg, 406 S.E.2d at 55 (accepting PPE claim because the posi-
tions did not involve safety and the employer lacked “reasonable good faith objective suspi-
cion”). Cf. Borse, 963 F.2d at 625-26 (these factors were relevant and probative but their ab-
sence was not necessarily fatal to a private employer’s mandatory drug testing policy).  
 271. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 603, 624 (1989) (justifying 
employee drug tests by asserting the government’s interest in regulating “safety-sensitive 
tasks” which outweighs the “requirement of individualized suspicion”). 
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challenged employer policies mandating polygraph testing272 and per-
sonal property searches.273 
 Not all PPE claims involving employee drug testing have been 
successful. Sometimes, the court explicitly rejects a constitutional 
privacy right as a basis for a PPE claim.274 In others, the court exam-
ines only statutory sources of public policy before rejecting the  
employee’s claim.275 
 As a general matter, the privacy right would normally not extend 
to information reasonably related to activity at the workplace for 
which the employer would have a legitimate business interest, espe-
cially where the investigative methods were not overly intrusive. For 
example, a federal district court in Pennsylvania rejected a privacy-
based PPE claim brought by an employee fired after an allegedly in-
trusive investigation of a personal matter, an alleged affair with a co-
worker.276 Noting that the employer confined its investigation to in-
terviewing other employees and examining company records, the 
court found that the employer’s methods were reasonable and reject-
ed the wrongful discharge claim.277 
 Furthermore, although it declined to use constitutional principles 
as evidence of public policy, the Third Circuit has analyzed privacy 
issues (based on common law privacy torts) as affected by employer 
drug-testing policies.278 The court found an employer’s policy requir-
ing employees to provide urine samples for drug screenings to be a 
significant intrusion of privacy.279 This was both because of the ex-
tremely intrusive manner in which a urine sample is collected, and 
because urine samples can yield “a host of private medical facts about 
an employee,” together creating a very strong expectation of privacy.280 
                                                                                                                  
 272. See, e.g., Leibowitz v. H.A. Winston Co., 493 A.2d 111, 115 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985). 
 273. See, e.g., Borse, 963 F.2d at 625. 
 274. See, e.g., Wilkinson v. Times Mirror Corp., 264 Cal. Rptr. 194 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 
1989) (private employer's offer of employment conditional on submission to the drug test 
not a violation of the right to privacy under the state constitution); Hennessey v. Coastal 
Eagle Point Oil Co., 589 A.2d 170, 176 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991), aff’d, 609 A.2d 11 
(N.J. 1992) (declining to apply federal and state constitutional privacy protections to private 
employers); Stein v. Davidson Hotel Co., 945 S.W.2d 714, 718 (Tenn. 1997) (no constitution-
based public policy protecting employees from random drug testing-based terminations).  
 275. See, e.g., Webster v. Motorola, Inc., 637 N.E.2d 203 (Mass. 1994) (holding private 
employer's universal drug testing program did not violate employee driver's statutory pri-
vacy rights); Folmsbee v. Tech Tool Grinding & Supply, Inc., 630 N.E.2d 586 (Mass. 1994) 
(holding private employer's universal drug testing program did not violate employee driv-
er's statutory privacy rights).  
 276. Rogers v. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., 500 F. Supp. 867, 868 (W.D. Pa. 1980). 
 277. Id. at 870. 
 278. Borse, 963 F.2d 611. 
 279. Id. at 620-21. 
 280. Id. at 619-21. 
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 Drawing again on statutory and case law protection for guidance, 
and analogizing to the free speech rules set out above, we propose 
Fourth Amendment-inspired contours to the PPE claim. Where an 
employee enjoys a reasonable expectation of privacy regarding par-
ticular information,281 an employer should not be able discharge an 
employee for failure to disclose such information unless it could rea-
sonably affect productivity, or materially and substantially affect the 
work environment. For example, for drug testing, intrusive employee 
questionnaire inquiries, or searches of personal areas owned by the 
employee like the employee’s car or purse, the employer must have 
some form of individualized suspicion that the “search” will uncover 
information relevant to actual employer interest. In the case of drug 
testing, individualized suspicion would not be required if the em-
ployment positions involved were safety-related. In like manner, the 
level of individualized suspicion required in any manner might de-
cline for particularly sensitive positions, e.g., inquiries into an em-
ployee’s financial affairs for positions entrusting employees with 
large sums of money. 
3.   Equal Protection 
 The Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of “equal protection” is 
another substantive right that quite logically translates to the pri-
vate work sphere. The salience of employment discrimination issues 
is obvious, as demonstrated by the plethora of federal and state stat-
utes providing protection against various types of employment dis-
crimination. There is no serious question that all states have a strong 
public policy against invidious discrimination in employment, at least 
with respect to such commonly protected categories as race, color, 
creed, national origin, and sex.282 There is a widespread societal con-
sensus that such types of discrimination are invidious.283 While dis-
approval of these other types of discrimination may not be as 
                                                                                                                  
 281. This “reasonable expectation of privacy” is a well-recognized concept in Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., 
concurring). Courts applying the PPE as suggested above would be able to draw upon a 
rich body of analogous case law to help make the initial determination of whether an em-
ployee had such an expectation of privacy. 
 282. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006) (declaring the discharge or refusal to hire on 
the basis of “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin” an “unlawful employment prac-
tice”); LA. CONST. art. I, § 12 (all prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race, religion, or 
nationality); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 37.2202 (2013); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.02 (2013).  
 283. E.g., Frank Newport, Little “Obama Effect” on Views About Race Relations, 
GALLUP  (Oct. 29, 2009), http.//www.gallup.com/poll/123944/Little-Obama-Effect-on-Race-
Relations.aspx (addressing views on equal job opportunities, or the lack thereof, among 
non-whites); Regina Corso, Three in Five Americans Say U.S. Has Long Way to Go to Reach 
Gender Equality, THE HARRIS POLL (Aug. 16, 2010), http://www.harrisinteractive.com/News 
Room/HarrisPolls/tabid/447/ct/ReadCustomDefault/mid/1508/ArticleId/452/Default.aspx (ad-
dressing views on gender equality in the workplace).  
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longstanding, both age discrimination and disability discrimination 
should probably also be counted as categories for which there is a 
clear policy of nondiscrimination.284 
 Moreover, the rights of women are implicated whenever employers 
engage in sexual harassment. Although such cases are normally re-
solved by reference to federal or state antidiscrimination statutes, 
procedural issues or the absence of statutory protection due to the 
small size of an employer may leave a common law claim like the 
PPE as the only available course.285 And, courts have recognized PPE 
claims in the context of sexual harassment.286 There also would seem 
to be no reason to exclude racial or religious harassment from cover-
age under the PPE. For commonly recognized workplace harassment 
claims, the PPE seems appropriate where necessary to vindicate con-
stitutional principles regarding sex discrimination. 
 Indeed, in this general area of employment discrimination, statu-
tory remedies may be so abundant that they may very well “crowd 
out” much of the use of the PPE. In Georgia, an appellate court held 
that the absence of state statutory protection for pregnancy discrimi-
nation ruled out recognition of a wrongful discharge cause of action 
on that ground.287 However, in Vermont, the state’s highest court 
ruled that the absence of state statutory protection against age dis-
crimination did not prevent recognition of a common law PPE ac-
tion.288 In addition, Washington’s Supreme Court recognized a wrong-
ful discharge claim based on sex discrimination where the employer 
had too few employees to fall within the state’s otherwise applicable 
antidiscrimination statute.289 Even though the state had recognized a 
public policy of protecting small businesses by limiting statutory 
remedies against them, the state Supreme Court allowed a sex-
discrimination-based PPE claim to proceed against a small busi-
ness.290 The court noted salient differences between the statutory and 
common law causes of action: only the former provided for adminis-
                                                                                                                  
 284. See, e.g., Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (2012) (for-
bidding discrimination against anyone at least forty years of age); Americans with Disabili-
ties Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2012) (stating that a “covered entity shall not discriminate 
against a qualified individual on the basis of disability”); GA. CODE ANN. § 34-6A-4 (2013); 
OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.112 (2013) (all generally forbidding employer discrimination based 
on certain disabilities); VA. CODE ANN. § 51.5-41 (2013); Payne v. Rozendaal, 520 A.2d 586, 
589 (Vt. 1986) (“[D]ischarge . . . solely on the basis of age is a practice so contrary to our 
society’s concern for providing equity and justice that there is a clear and compelling public 
policy against it.”). 
 285. See, e.g., Collins v. Rizkana, 652 N.E.2d 653, 660-61 (Ohio 1995). 
 286. Id. at 660-62.  
 287. Borden v. Johnson, 395 S.E.2d 628, 629-30 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990).  
 288. Payne, 520 A.2d at 593-94. 
 289. Roberts v. Dudley, 993 P.2d 901, 909-11 (Wash. 2000).  
 290. Id. at 908; Griffin v. Eller, 922 P.2d 788, 792 (Wash. 1996). 
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trative proceedings, attorney fee remedies, and potential liability for 
adverse employment action other than full termination.291 
 Certainly, the availability of a PPE cause of action under common 
law could help a wronged employee where a state or federal statute 
covers the same type of discrimination, i.e., the same protected class, 
but the common law claim provides better remedies, has a more for-
giving limitations period, or allows suit against small employers with 
too few employees to be statutorily covered.292 Moreover, the availa-
bility of the PPE also might be desirable if the protected class in 
question is not covered by statute. For example, suppose an employer 
fires a worker for living with a romantic partner without being mar-
ried, or for having children out of wedlock. Or, suppose the employer 
discriminates against the employee because the employee had been 
born out of wedlock, or because the employee proceeded to marry 
someone the employer disapproved of against the employer’s advice. 
In some jurisdictions, this might be covered by statutes barring dis-
crimination on the basis of marital status.293 However, in most states, 
no statutory relief would be available.294 
 Such are prime examples of the importance of using constitutional 
principles as evidence of public policy. The Supreme Court has long 
held that government discrimination against children of unmarried 
parents violates the Equal Protection Clause,295 and has subjected 
such types of discrimination to heightened, so-called “intermediate,” 
scrutiny.296 It also has held that a combination of sex plus marital 
discrimination violates the Equal Protection Clause.297 Further, the 
Court has held that marriage is a “fundamental right.”298 
 It might very well be the case that, despite the absence of any 
substantive statutory protection for that type of discrimination, an 
employee fired under any of the circumstances described above could 
                                                                                                                  
 291. Id. at 911. 
 292. See supra Part IV.  
 293. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151B, § 4 (2013); MINN. STAT. § 363A.08 (2013); 
OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.030 (2013) (all prohibiting employment discrimination based on 
marital status). 
 294. Federal antidiscrimination law does not provide employment discrimination pro-
tection on the basis of marital status. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012) (Title VII bars dis-
crimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin).  
 295. See, e.g., N.J. Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619, 620-21 (1973); Weber v. 
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175-76 (1972). 
 296. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 570-71 (1996) (analyzing “intermediate 
scrutiny” as an inquiry into whether a statutory classification is “substantially related to 
an important governmental objective”). 
 297. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 652-53 (1975) (holding that a statute that 
treats widower less favorably than widows is an invalid “sex plus marital status” type  
of discrimination).  
 298. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 381 (1978); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1,  
11 (1967).  
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make out a PPE claim, using constitutional principles as a basis.299 
Under such circumstances, the constitutionally-inflected common law 
claim would actually expand the scope of protected categories from 
those listed in the applicable antidiscrimination statutes. Rather 
than deviating from analogous statutes in such procedural ways as 
statute of limitations or types of remedies available, this use of the 
PPE would depart from an analogous statute in substance.  
 If successful, such a use of the PPE might have a dramatic effect 
on the gay rights debate. Many states, like the federal government, 
lack any statutory protection for employees discriminated against 
because of their sexual orientation. However, governmental discrimi-
nation against homosexuals has come under fire from the Supreme 
Court in recent decades, and this past year’s decisions have only in-
creased the pressure.300 Such decisions, plus the large number of low-
er court decisions striking down anti-gay discrimination,301 may es-
tablish a strong public policy against discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation, such that discharging a private employee would 
create wrongful discharge liability.  
4.   Free Exercise 
 The Free Exercise Clause prevents the government from interfer-
ing in the worship practices of individuals.302 At a minimum, it cre-
                                                                                                                  
 299. However, at least one court rejected a PPE claim alleging termination because the 
employee had married a coworker, rejecting the idea that an employee had a right to marry 
the person of their choice free of employer action. McCluskey v. Clark Oil & Ref. Corp., 498 
N.E.2d 559, 561 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986). 
 300. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013) (invalidating on equal 
protection and federalism grounds a provision of a federal statute denying federal benefits  
to same-sex couples legally married in their home state); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.  
558, 578 (2003) (invalidating on substantive due process grounds a statute criminalizing 
same-sex sodomy); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (invalidating on equal protec-
tion grounds a state constitutional amendment which barred local jurisdictions from pass-
ing gay rights ordinances). 
 301. See, e.g., MacDonald v. Moose, 710 F.3d 154, 166 (4th Cir. 2013) (concluding that 
statute prohibiting sodomy between two persons is facially unconstitutional); Finstuen v. 
Crutcher, 496 F.3d 1139, 1156 (10th Cir. 2007) (declaring Oklahoma's adoption statute un-
constitutional under the Full Faith and Credit Clause because it denied recognition to valid 
out-of-state adoptions by same-sex couples); Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 
1003 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (state’s same-sex marriage ban violated both federal equal protection 
and due process); Jegley v. Picado, 80 S.W.3d 332, 353 (Ark. 2002) (determining that a statute 
prohibiting certain sexual conduct between members of same sex violated the fundamental 
right to privacy and equal protection clause of the state constitution); Goodridge v. Dep’t of 
Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969 (Mass. 2003) (granting same-sex couples the protections, 
benefits, and obligations of civil marriage on equal protection grounds). 
 302. Thomas Berg, Free Exercise of Religion, in THE HERITAGE GUIDE TO THE 
CONSTITUTION 309-11 (Edwin Meese III et al. ed., 2005) (summarizing the Free Exercise 
Clause as protecting a person’s religiously motivated conduct and belief from government 
action); see also Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990) 
(defining the free exercise of religion as “the right to believe and profess whatever religious 
doctrine one desires”). 
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ates a clear and substantial public policy against religious discrimi-
nation, one which is mirrored in federal and state statutes barring 
religious discrimination in employment.303 If use of the Free Exercise 
Clause in the PPE did no more than this, it would not contribute 
much, since antidiscrimination statutes of this type are so wide-
spread. However, as with the Equal Protection Clause discussed 
above, it could provide the basis for a PPE claim in those instances 
where the comparable statute(s) do not apply, e.g., where the em-
ployer is too small for statutory coverage, or where the plaintiff seeks 
a different remedy from the one provided by the statute. 
 Beyond that, its greatest impact might be to protect employees 
who are fired for refusing to engage in worship practices. If an em-
ployer holds weekly prayer services during working hours, can it re-
quire employee attendance on pain of termination? A Free Exercise 
Clause-inspired PPE would suggest not. 304 
 Such a PPE cause of action would have to give way if the employer 
were itself a religious organization. Antidiscrimination statutes often 
create exemptions for religious organizations, which are allowed to 
favor coreligionists, or even exclude persons outside the faith, when 
hiring for certain positions. These exemptions are motivated, in sig-
nificant part, by a desire to avoid interfering in the Free Exercise in-
terests of the religious organization employers.305 
 Another scenario would cover an employee dismissed for engaging 
in non-disruptive worship practices, either on or off premises. For 
example, consider an employer who employs many Muslims, and 
treats them the same as non-Muslims, but does not permit them to 
pray on prayer mats during the day, even if they are on break; or, an 
employer who has many Jewish employees, but does not permit them 
to wear yarmulkes because he bars all employees from wearing 
headgear of any kind. They may not be guilty of religious discrimina-
tion, but they may be interfering with the employees’ rights to wor-
ship as they see fit. 
 Of course, this is one scenario where antidiscrimination statutes 
may provide more protection than the PPE. Title VII, and many com-
parable state statutes, require that employers provide a “reasonabl[e] 
                                                                                                                  
 303. For examples of state statutes prohibiting employment discrimination based on 
religion, see NEB. REV. STAT. § 23-2513 (2012); OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.003 (2013); TEX. LAB. 
CODE ANN. § 21.125 (West 2013); UTAH CODE ANN. 1953 § 34A-5-106 (West 2013). 
 304. Of course, such a situation might already be covered under a “forced speech” theo-
ry. See supra Part V.A.1.  
 305. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 710 
(2012) (holding that the Free Exercise Clause required the “ministerial exception” to bar 
teacher from suing her school under workplace discrimination laws). 
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accommodat[ion]” of employee religious practices.306 Thus, the em-
ployer might be required to take affirmative steps to make exemp-
tions for a particular employee so as to avoid a substantial burden on 
that employee’s religious practices. Thus, if there were an otherwise 
neutral dress code which did not permit men to wear head garments 
indoors, an employer might be required to exempt men wearing tur-
bans or yarmulkes for religious reasons.307 
 This is not the case under the Free Exercise Clause, where the 
rule is that the government has no obligation to modify neutral laws 
of general application, even if their effect is to place a substantial 
burden on religious practice.308 If the PPE followed the contours of 
the constitutional right in this manner, it would not require reasona-
ble accommodations for religious employees. If this were in fact the 
rule, it arguably addresses the concern that this application of the 
PPE would be too burdensome on employers. 
C.   Closer Cases 
 The constitutional provisions discussed immediately above are 
strong candidates for inclusion in a PPE analysis. The provisions dis-
cussed below also represent very important liberty interests, but are 
controversial enough, or sufficiently ill-defined, to warrant caution 
regarding their usage by courts adjudicating PPE claims.  
1.   Reproductive Rights And Gender 
 The Due Process Clause gives rise not only to procedural due pro-
cess protections, but substantive due process protections as well. 
More specifically, there is a long line of cases stemming from the ear-
ly to mid-twentieth century where the Supreme Court recognized a 
right of “privacy” that protects individuals from state intrusions into 
certain deeply private decisions. These decisions include both basic 
ones about whether to bear children,309 and also, those involving chil-
                                                                                                                  
 306. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2012); see also D.C. CODE § 1-607.01 (2013) (mandating 
reasonable accommodation for the free exercise of religion); TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 21.108 
(West 2013) (prohibiting religious discrimination unless reasonable accommodation unduly 
burdens the employer).  
 307. See, e.g., EEOC v. Reads, Inc., 759 F. Supp. 1150, 1158 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (describing 
“religious garb” as falling within the ambit of statutory protection).  
 308. See Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879  
(1990) (holding that neutral laws of general applicability do not implicate the Free  
Exercise clause). 
 309. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965) (invalidating statute prohib-
iting the use of birth-control devices by holding that the penumbras of the guarantees in 
the Bill of Rights create “zones of privacy”); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-42 
(1942) (striking down a forced sterilization act while addressing marriage and procreation 
as being “fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race”). 
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drearing,310 family living arrangements,311 and intimate relations.312 
The strength of these rights is bolstered by statutes that protect 
against discrimination on the basis of marital status.313 
 Within the general area of substantive due process, one area ripe 
for PPE analysis is the area of reproductive rights. In a variety of 
cases around the country, wrongful discharge plaintiffs have claimed 
they were fired for having abortions.314 Most of these cases either 
went unresolved or were settled.315 
 The array of statutory remedies for persons in this situation is un-
clear. Employees discriminated against for having abortions likely 
have a claim under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA).316 The 
Third and Sixth Circuits have so held,317 and the EEOC regulations 
so indicate.318 This right, apparently, also extends to adverse em-
ployment actions taken because an employee merely considers having 
an abortion.319 
 A related potential issue involves an employer taking an adverse 
action against an employee for not having an abortion. Such an em-
ployer may prefer that the employee not bring the pregnancy to term 
for practical reasons: for example, out of fear the employee will ask for 
maternity leave and flexible hours, and/or will not be able to devote the 
same energy to the job. Or, the employer may disapprove of the em-
ployee becoming pregnant out of wedlock, or through an illicit affair.  
 Several state courts have recognized the PPE for pregnancy dis-
crimination. Both Washington and California have recognized such 
                                                                                                                  
 310. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (rejecting statute requiring 
all children to attend public elementary school); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 
(1923) (finding statute requiring all classes to be taught in English unconstitutional under 
a substantive due process analysis). 
 311. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 8 (1974) (upholding limitations on 
single-family dwellings to traditional families or to two or fewer unrelated persons). 
 312. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (holding that intimate consensual 
sexual conduct was part of the liberty protected by substantive due process). 
 313. See, e.g., Federal Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (2012); ALASKA 
STAT. § 18.80.220 (2013) (both making it unlawful for employers to discriminate on the 
basis of, inter alia, marital status).  
 314. Noble, supra note 9. Not all such cases were resolved, id., and at least one was 
resolved through confidential settlement. See Craver, supra note 9.  
 315. Noble, supra note 9.  
 316. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012) (barring sex discrimination); see al-
so § 2000e(k) (defining sex discrimination to include discrimination on account of “pregnan-
cy, childbirth, or related medical conditions”). In 1978, Congress passed the Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act as an amendment to Title VII. See Turic v. Holland Hospitality, Inc., 85 
F.3d 1211, 1213 (6th Cir. 1996). 
 317. Doe v. C.A.R.S. Prot. Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d 358, 364 (3d Cir. 2008); Turic, 85  
F.3d at 1214. 
 318. 29 C.F.R. § 1604 app. (2013).  
 319. Turic, 85 F.3d at 1214.  
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claims, drawing from their state constitutions to derive the requisite 
public policy where the employer’s small size made the relevant state 
statute inapplicable.320 By contrast, an intermediate appellate court 
in Georgia rejected such a pregnancy discrimination PPE claim, rea-
soning that courts generally should defer to the legislature in decid-
ing what public policies could trump the general rule of at-will em-
ployment.321 Perhaps cognizant of the PDA, the Georgia opinion re-
fers to the fact that in addition to state statutes, there are unspeci-
fied “federal statutes” that also limit the at-will doctrine.322 But the 
extent to which such federal statutes should inform the “public poli-
cy” analysis for PPE purposes, the court reasoned, is a decision best 
left to the state legislature.323 
 This seems to be a proper area for the PPE. The constitutional 
right of persons to make decisions about reproduction has a long lin-
eage. Early in the twentieth century, the Supreme Court recognized 
an unenumerated federal constitutional right to decide to reproduce 
free from government interference.324 The Court extended the protec-
tion for the right to reproduce to the decision not to reproduce, guaran-
teeing a right of access to contraception.325 In order to recognize such 
rights despite their not being expressly laid out in the Constitution’s 
text, the Court had to find that these rights were “fundamental,” i.e., 
that they were “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”326 Forty 
years ago, the Court recognized that the constitutional right to decide 
not to reproduce extended to the decision to have an abortion, a right 
which was reexamined and reaffirmed twenty years later and which is 
still recognized today.327 Given the long history of reproductive rights, 
                                                                                                                  
 320. Badih v. Myers, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 229, 293 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Roberts v. 
Dudley, 993 P.2d 901, 911 (Wash. 2000). 
 321. Borden v. Johnson, 395 S.E.2d 628, 629 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990). 
 322. Id. 
 323. Id. 
 324. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (invalidating law providing for 
forced sterilization of recidivist offenders). 
 325. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 694 (1977) (extending this right 
to persons over age sixteen); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (extending this 
right to unmarried couples); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 471, 485-86 (1965) (recog-
nizing this right for married couples).  
 326. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 703 (1997) (citing multiple Supreme 
Court cases using this phrase). The Court has used several different formulations of this 
test for being a “fundamental” right. See id. at 721 (observing fundamental rights to be 
“deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition”); see also Planned Parenthood of Se. 
Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (noting that these fundamental rights “involv[e] the 
most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to 
personal dignity and autonomy”). 
 327. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 869-74 (reaffirming the core holding of Roe regarding the 
right to an abortion, and adopting an “undue burden” test for all restrictions on abortion 
prior to fetal viability); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (holding a constitutional 
right to abortion).  
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it seems a good candidate for the kind of public policy which courts can 
rely on to protect at-will employees under the common law.  
 As a matter of constitutional rights, it should make no difference 
whether the right in question is the right to bear a child or not to 
bear a child. The Court has made clear that among the most funda-
mental rights is the “decision whether to bear or beget a child.”328 Ar-
guably, though, abortion may be properly separated from the rights 
to be pregnant or to use contraception. Because a difficult moral 
question exists as to exactly when a fetus becomes a “person,” it is 
distinct. This philosophical question is still largely unresolved in our 
society, making abortion rights extremely controversial. For this rea-
son, perhaps courts should be cautious about wading into this area 
with the PPE. 
 Further, because so many people have strongly held religious be-
liefs about abortion, court-imposed limits on employers via the PPE 
might trigger constitutional issues about the employers’ own reli-
gious freedom rights.329 If an employer considers abortion to be mur-
der, perhaps it should not be required to (from its viewpoint) support 
murderers by employing them. Indeed, the awkwardness of contin-
ued employment after the abortion would seem most acute in small 
firms with only a few employees, where employer and employee likely 
personally interact. These are precisely the types of firms where the 
PPE might be most relevant, given its utility as a backup where 
statutory remedies are unavailable.  
 The solution may be to recognize abortion rights only narrowly 
through the PPE. Under current precedent, a constitutional right to 
abortion exists only before fetal viability.330 Outside that period, the 
right exists only where necessary to protect the woman from serious 
threats to life or health.331 Public opinion polls show a consistent ma-
jority of Americans favor abortion rights, at least during the very ear-
ly stages of pregnancy.332 But such support drops during later stages 
of the pregnancy.333 If PPE protection were to exist for abortion at all, 
                                                                                                                  
 328. Eisendstadt, 405 U.S. at 453. 
 329. See Michael Dichiara, A Case of First Impression: The Third Circuit Recognizes 
that Having an Abortion Is Protected by Title VII, 33 RUTGERS L. REC. 12, 14-15 (2009) 
(raising this concern with respect to statutory protection for employment discrimination 
targeting abortion). 
 330. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846. 
 331. Id. 
 332. Abortion, GALLUP HISTORICAL TRENDS (May 13, 2014), http://www.gallup.com/poll/ 
1576/abortion.aspx (over 60% of Americans believed abortions should be legal in the first 
trimester; percentage dropped to less than 30% with respect to the second trimester). 
 333. Lydia Saad, Majority of Americans Still Support Roe v. Wade Decision, GALLUP 
(Jan. 22, 2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll/160058/majority-americans-support-roe-wade-
decision.aspx (acknowledging that “support drops off sharply, to 27%, for second-trimester 
abortions, and further still, to 14%, for third-trimester abortions”). 
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it should be limited to abortions taking place to prevent serious and 
legitimate health risks to women, or which take place relatively early 
on during pregnancy.  
2.   Substantive Due Process 
 A Native-American sales clerk wears shoulder-length hair as an 
expression of his identity and spirituality. His private employer, a 
grocery store, orders him to cut his hair; when he refuses, it fires 
him. Does the employee have any legal remedy? The Alaska Supreme 
Court said no, rejecting a claim that the employee had any right of 
privacy or free expression as against a private employer, given the 
constitutional requirement of state action.334 
 The court resolved the issue by rejecting the threshold notion that 
constitutional principles had any analogous relevance to the PPE’s 
regulation of purely private conduct. But the case presents an inter-
esting test for the use of substantive due process as a source of policy 
under the PPE.335 
 Substantive due process doctrine suggests that there exist certain 
individual rights that are so fundamental that the state may not bur-
den them, even if they are not expressly enumerated in the text of the 
Constitution.336 Substantive due process is controversial precisely be-
cause it is open-ended. The recognition of rights untethered to consti-
tutional text creates the potential for subjective “judicial activism.”337 
 Thus, with the exception of those reproductive rights like contra-
ception for which there has emerged a sound and broad judicial and 
public opinion consensus, courts should not use substantive due pro-
cess as a “catch-all” measure to broaden the PPE, lest the exception 
swallow the rule and all non-merit-related grounds for termination 
become invalid violations of an employee’s right to be free from arbi-
trary action. If at-will employment is to retain any robust meaning, 
                                                                                                                  
 334. Miller v. Safeway, Inc., 102 P.3d 282, 288-90 (Alaska 2004). 
 335. One can safely put aside consideration of this as a Free Speech issue. Where con-
duct as opposed to pure speech is concerned, the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause 
affords no protection unless the conduct is properly considered “expressive conduct.” Here, 
while the Native American may have intended his long hair to express an idea, it may not 
be the case that most people would reasonably interpret the long hair as principally ex-
pressive. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 409 (1989) (defining “expressive conduct” 
under the First Amendment so as to require that persons would reasonably interpret the 
conduct as being expressive).  
 336. See James W. Ely Jr., Due Process Clause, in THE HERITAGE GUIDE TO THE 
CONSTITUTION 395 (Edwin Meese III et al. ed., 2005) (describing these fundamental rights 
to be “beyond the reach of government”).  
 337. See Luís Roberto Barroso, The Americanization of Constitutional Law and its Par-
adoxes: Constitutional Theory and Constitutional Jurisdiction in the Contemporary World, 
16 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 579, 580, 599-604 (2010) (using this term to describe an era in 
which “contemporary democracies” sought to advance rights not listed in the Constitution).  
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employers must be able to fire people for irrational, arbitrary, idio-
syncratic, even quirky reasons, as long as those reasons do not 
threaten broadly, strongly recognized rights.338 
3.   Second Amendment 
 Another candidate for the PPE is the Second Amendment. Within 
the last few years, the Supreme Court has recognized that this 
Amendment does indeed guarantee a right to bear arms even for an 
individual with no connection to militia service.339 This right extends 
to the use of arms reasonably related to individual self-defense, and 
includes those arms, including handguns, which are not “dangerous 
and unusual weapons.”340 It applies to state governments as well as 
the federal government.341 While the Supreme Court cases to date 
have dealt with the use of guns in the home, credible arguments exist 
for protecting the right to carry arms outside the home into public 
areas to further the self-defense rationale.342 Should the PPE protect 
the right of employees to bring weapons to work? 
 Courts are just beginning to address the general issue of the right 
to bear arms at work, and are split. In Mitchell v. University of Ken-
tucky, the Supreme Court of Kentucky extended the PPE to the right 
to bear arms, finding wrongful discharge where a public university 
fired a properly licensed at-will employee for keeping a weapon in his 
car on university property in violation of university rules.343 In that 
case, conflicting statutes seemed to side with both employee and em-
ployer in this situation, and the court concluded, through a general 
                                                                                                                  
 338. See Hunter v. Port Auth. of Allegheny Cnty. 419 A.2d 631, 634-35 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1980) (state constitutional provision protecting freedom to seek a livelihood prevented re-
fusal to hire based on prior criminal convictions unrelated to job merit; though the employ-
er was government agency, language suggests possible broader application); see also 
Fellhauer v. City of Geneva, 568 N.E.2d 870, 877 (Ill. 1991). 
 339. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008). 
 340. Id. at 627. 
 341. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3036-44 (2010). 
 342. United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 467 (4th Cir. 2011) (“[T]here now 
exists a clearly-defined fundamental right to possess firearms for self-defense within the 
home. But a considerable degree of uncertainty remains as to the scope of that right be-
yond the home and the standards for determining whether and how the right can be bur-
dened by governmental regulation.”); Michael P. O’Shea, Modeling the Second Amendment 
Right to Carry Arms (I): Judicial Tradition and the Scope of “Bearing Arms” for Self-
Defense, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 585, 615 (2012) (interpreting Heller to suggest that “the defen-
sive role for which handguns are uniquely suited—routine carry outside the home—is also 
constitutionally protected”). Cf. Scott v. Extracorporeal, Inc., 545 A.2d 334, 342-43 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1988) (declining to apply exception to asserted right of self-defense in workplace 
fistfight, deferring to management to assign responsibility to some or all participants in 
disruptive workplace altercations). 
 343. 366 S.W.3d 895, 903 (Ky. 2012).  
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review of still other statutes, that the termination violated Ken-
tucky’s public policy.344 
 Although the employer in this case was a public entity, the court 
found a public policy that extended to private employers as well.345 The 
court did not rely expressly on the Second Amendment or a Kentucky 
Constitution provision; indeed, it said it would “refrain from reaching 
constitutional issues when other, non-constitutional grounds can be 
relied upon.”346 Since the employer was a state actor, this statement 
could merely indicate an unwillingness to interpret directly either the 
state or federal constitution; it may not explicitly address whether the 
court felt comfortable in drawing upon Second Amendment or related 
constitutional doctrines in reaching the PPE merits.  
 Contrast Hansen v. America Online, Inc., where the Supreme Court 
of Utah rejected a similar claim involving the keeping of guns in an 
employer’s parking lot.347 The court looked to the Utah Constitution in 
evaluating the state’s public policy. That constitution did protect a 
right to bear arms, but did not specifically address rights of employees 
during working hours.348 Given the court’s general preference to apply 
the PPE “parsimoniously” in deference to the default at-will doctrine, 
it declined to extend the right to bear arms to the workplace.349 
 The two cases might be reconciled by noting that the Kentucky 
statutes provided protection for employees of private employers, 
whereas the legislative history of the Utah statutes suggested no ap-
plication to private employers.350 However, the at-will-friendly Utah 
case arose before the U.S. Supreme Court decisions recognizing for 
the first time an individual right to bear arms,351 while the PPE-
friendly Kentucky case arose afterwards. The difference may be 
simply due to evolving constitutional doctrine. 
 A related issue arose in West Virginia, where the state supreme 
court recognized a PPE claim based on a policy guaranteeing a right 
of self-defense.352 In that case, the plaintiff was discharged for dis-
arming a woman who was attempting to rob the employer’s premises, 
an act that violated company policy against interfering with a store 
robbery.353 The court looked to the state constitution, state statutes, 
                                                                                                                  
 344. Id. at 900-03.  
 345. Id. at 901. 
 346. Id. at 898 (quoting Baker v. Fletcher, 204 S.W.3d 589, 597-98 (Ky. 2006)). 
 347. 96 P.3d 950, 956 (Utah 2004). 
 348. Id. at 953. 
 349. Id. at 954. 
 350. Compare Mitchell, 366 S.W.3d at 901, with Hansen, 96 P.3d at 954-55. 
 351. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3036-44 (2010); District of Columbia 
v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008).  
 352. Feliciano v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 559 S.E.2d 713, 723-24 (W. Va. 2001).  
 353. Id. at 716. 
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and West Virginia case law, finding the existence of a public policy 
favoring a right of self-defense.354 However, the court held that this 
right must be balanced against the employer’s legitimate interests in 
keeping order on its premises.355 Thus, firing an employee for defend-
ing himself creates a presumption of PPE wrongful discharge liabil-
ity, but the employer may rebut that presumption by showing it had 
a legitimate business reason for the termination.356 
 This latter approach seems more reasonable, especially in the con-
text of bringing guns to work. Although some states have recognized 
by statute a right of employees to bring weapons to work,357 in the 
absence of such statutes, there is a paucity of case law supporting 
such a right as a constitutional matter. That is not surprising, since 
reasonable people differ as to whether an employer has a legitimate 
interest in eliminating the risk of gunplay on its premises or prefer-
ring other means to ensure employee safety. Thus, standing on its 
own and without state statutory support, the Second Amendment, 
and similar constitutional provisions regarding the right to bear 
arms, seem unlikely candidates for the PPE.358 This may change, giv-
en that the law in this area is just beginning to take shape. For ex-
ample, the Supreme Court has not yet established the applicable 
standard of review for Second Amendment rights. Nor has the Court 
determined what interest an employer has in regulating arms in the 
workplace. How the federal courts ultimately treat this employer in-
terest will inform the development of the PPE with respect to the  
Second Amendment. 
VI.   CONCLUSION  
 Courts considering constitutional claims borrow from common law 
doctrine. There is no reason to treat with suspicion the reverse dy-
namic. Constitutional principles are compelling sources of our public 
policy. They stem from foundational principles embodying our most 
deeply held beliefs. They should certainly inform the analysis when 
courts apply the PPE to the at-will employment rule. 
                                                                                                                  
 354. Id. at 718-22. 
 355. Id. at 723. 
 356. Id. at 723-24.  
 357. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-135 (2013) (certifying that private and public 
employers do not have the right to prohibit their employees from keeping lawful fire-
arms locked in their vehicles); VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-915 (2012) (“[N]o locality shall 
adopt any workplace rule . . . that prevents an employee of that locality from storing at 
that locality’s workplace a lawfully possessed firearm and ammunition in a locked pri-
vate motor vehicle.”). 
 358. See Gardner v. Loomis Armored Inc., 913 P.2d 377, 386 (Wash. 1996) (PPE claim 
succeeded where company fired security guard for violating company rule in order to save 
woman from life-threatening hostage situation).  
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 But courts should be circumspect in applying to the private em-
ployment context constitutional principles designed to cabin abuses 
by government. In doing so, they should limit their gaze to constitu-
tional rules creating rights held by individuals—rights which are 
clear, uncontroversial, and readily analogous to the situation of a 
private employee. Matters of free speech, Fourth Amendment priva-
cy, and equal protection fall easily into this category. Criminal proce-
dure rights, substantive due process concerns, and Second Amend-
ment issues do not.  
 Traditionally, business and employment law questions are viewed 
as inquiries distinct from, and perhaps more pragmatic than, the 
seemingly more abstract doctrines of constitutional law. The PPE 
provides a means for an open exchange of ideas between these two 
ostensibly distinct areas of the law. At the same time, the use of con-
stitutional values in the PPE creates a fail-safe, a means of filling the 
gap left by statutory and contract theories to curb the most troubling 
employer abuses.  
 Understandably, employers will be concerned about adding yet 
another set of grounds for employees to sue them. The employer-
employee relationship is, and should remain, a business decision and 
the at-will doctrine, therefore, should not be undermined. However, if 
we are to continue recognizing a PPE—and we should, to curb the 
most outrageous subversions of public policy by employers while also 
acknowledging the economic vulnerability of employees—then it 
makes no sense to consider “lesser” sources of public policy but sudden-
ly become shy about using the “greater” source of the Constitution. 
 The law sets a floor for minimum fair treatment of employees. A 
properly robust, and properly selective, use of constitutional law to 
inform the PPE raises that floor where it could use some raising.  
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